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ABSTRACT 
Outside the US, the commercial development of shale gas and oil will need to overcome significant 
legal and regulatory challenges if it is ever to take off. This study identifies several key features that 
have contributed to shale’s economic success in the US and applies them to three country settings 
where policy decisions have been taken to advance a shale resources agenda: Argentina, Colombia 
and the United Kingdom. Each country is at an initial stage in the development of its resources and 
has explored various legal instruments to advance its policy aims. In reviewing their experiences, we 
may be able to identify the emergence of a dedicated body of good or best practices. The study 
confirms that governments tend initially to rely heavily on established hydrocarbons regulatory 
approaches, where they exist, but that these quickly prove fragile or insufficient, and need to be 
supplemented by new measures and institutions targeted specifically at meeting the challenges 
arising from ownership, infrastructure (including local content) and consent which may otherwise 
inhibit investment in this energy sector. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Some years ago, the idea that unconventional oil and gas resources could be developed outside of
the USA and Canada, triggering similar transformative effects for the economies concerned, caught 
the imagination of policy-makers, international organizations and researchers.1 Evidence of 
unconventional resources2 in abundant quantities exists in many parts of the world. If large-scale 
development were to happen outside of North America, it would constitute a new phase in the 
commercial development of shale gas and oil: we might call it Shale 2.0. Undoubtedly, this would 
1 For examples of this body of literature, see Grant Mark Nuelle, ‘Prospects for Shale Development Outside the 
USA: Evaluating Nations’ Regulatory and Fiscal Regimes for Unconventional Hydrocarbons’ (2015) 8 JWELB 
232–68; Susan L Sakmar, ‘The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the Role Model for the 
Development of Shale Gas around the World?’ (University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No 2011-27). 
2 Usually, this comprises shale gas, tight gas, shale oil, coal bed methane, hydrates and biogenic gas. The term 
‘unconventional’ indicates that these resources are not capable of being extracted by drilling alone. They 
therefore take the extraction process closer in the direction of manufacturing, since they require the 
technologies of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling: see P Stevens, Parliamentary Evidence (Chatham 
House 2011). In general, they also have higher capital intensity and operating costs than conventional resource 
activity, as well as greater water consumption and chemical use. 
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occur only if certain regulatory conditions were met, reflecting the very different and diverse 
circumstances of countries outside of North America, and the impacts of Shale 1.0. Yet, whatever 
the initial expectations of policy-makers and investors, this further, ‘transnational’ phase has yet to 
happen. Despite evident interest among many governments in exploring the potential for 
unconventional resource development, and among a few investors, commercial activity has been 
evident in only a very few locations and on a large scale, mostly in one, the US. 
Two of the more commonly cited reasons for this lack of ‘take-off’ are the opposition from 
activist groups to such development in most countries with prospective resources (sometimes 
described in shorthand as the industry’s lack of a ‘social licence to operate’),3 and for a time the 
coincidental occurrence of a sharp decline in oil and gas prices between 2014 and 2017, leading to 
reduced interest in high-cost forms of energy.4 Between 2014 and 2016, upstream oil and gas 
investment declined by 44 per cent, but in 2017 there was a 53 per cent increase in shale investment 
in the US.5 If the latter source of constraint to shale activity proves to be only a temporary one, the 
former is unlikely to be so transient for countries outside of the USA.6 
This study is directed at the legal and regulatory variable in the attraction of investment in 
Shale 2.0. With its promise of enhancing energy independence, few would be so bold as to rule out 
the possibility that in some form and at some time it ‘might’ happen. Indeed, by 2018 some evidence 
of a potential Shale 2.0 is already emerging.7 With appropriate legal conditions, large-scale 
                                                          
3 Don C Smith, Jessica M Richards and RJ Colwell, ‘Where “shale” We Go from Here: Opportunities and 
Challenges in Shale Plays Located Outside the USA’ (2017) 10 JWELB 159–219. 
4 This affects unconventional resources since they have costs attached to a lack of infrastructure and water 
availability, as well as swift production times, to name a few factors. 
5 International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2017, 11. 
6 In the North American context, the first known fracking arbitration involving NAFTA art 1128 commenced in 
2013. Lone Pine Resources v Canada concerns a claim by a US-registered company that the revocation of an 
exploration permit by the Province of Quebec amounts to an expropriation of its rights and requires 
compensation. Both the Governments of the US and Mexico have made submissions which are in the public 
domain and which appear to support the Canadian Government position (Investment Arbitration Reporter, 22 
August 2017). The case is ongoing. 
7 Diverse examples of how Shale 2.0 might emerge include: evidence of very large shale oil deposits in Bahrain 
(Oil and Gas Journal, 16 April 2018); increasing shale gas production in China with 700 wells forecast between 
2018 and 2020 (Reuters, 16 April 2018), lifting of a moratorium on fracking in Australia’s Northern Territory 
investment in developing these resources may well take place. In its focus on the legal and 
regulatory variable, this study adopts a comparative approach, using several case studies to illustrate 
how particular legal, contractual and regulatory mechanisms have been drawn on in common and 
civil law jurisdictions, and how countries at dissimilar stages of development of their unconventional 
resources, have created strategies to stimulate investment and to regulate the operations related to 
these resources. 
In terms of our structure, we provide a brief overview of Shale 1.0 (Section 2), in time 
commencing around 2002 and ending with the oil price collapse in 2014. The idea is an analytical 
construct, intended to capture events and expectations that contrast with a later period of 
reassessment and transition to Shale 2.0. Several commentators have sought to identify and assess 
the conditions behind the US success in Shale 1.0, and to ask which ones were essential and whether 
some or any of these were or are present in other countries. The US experience occupies centre 
stage in Shale 1.0 not only existentially but also because of external perceptions of its experience, 
characterized by initial lofty expectations and subsequent scepticism. The mixture of positives and 
negatives is important. In the absence of alternative national experiences, the question became one 
of whether the US experience made it a ‘role model’ or a unique case.8 Even at an early stage, it was 
clear that some features were unique to this setting.9 It is the ‘base jurisdiction’ for our study. 
The core of our article (Sections 3–5) is an examination of three countries that have taken 
policy decisions to advance a shale resources agenda, but which reflect dissimilar stages in the 
development of these resources. In each case, the subsoil minerals are publicly owned, the State has 
a pervasive role in hydrocarbons activity and to a greater or lesser extent conventional hydrocarbons 
                                                          
(Financial Times, 17 April 2018), and the UK’s first exploration well drilled by Cuadrilla in April 2018: 
<https://cuadrillaresources.com/media-resources/press-releases/> accessed 12 July 2018. 
8 See citations in Notes 1 and 2, and The Wall Street Journal. IEA Sees Spread of Shale Gas Revolution Before 
the End of the Decade. 17 June 2014. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/iea-sees-spread-of-shale-revolution-
before-end-of-decade-1402988483> accessed 12 July 2018. 
9 For example, the report by Chatham House: Paul Stevens, The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality? 
(Chatham House 2010) and, with greater emphasis on the downside of shale developments, (2012) The Shale 
Gas Revolution: Developments and Changes. 
activity is already established under an officially sanctioned regulatory system. Since our interest lies 
in the kinds of legal instrument and related good industry practices that make unconventional 
resource development possible, we have chosen countries that have a positive policy towards this 
new industry. We are aware that other countries have taken a different approach, prohibiting its 
development. Our selection does not involve making a judgment for or against the development of 
shale gas or oil. Rather, it follows from our research goal of exploring the initial legal instruments 
and emerging practices that are deemed appropriate to this still relatively new kind of hydrocarbons 
operations. 
The countries we have selected for our study are threefold. First, there is Argentina, the 
country which is outside of the USA probably has the most proven resources of unconventional 
hydrocarbons in the world, mostly located in a single geological formation, known with the 
unpromising name of ‘Vaca Muerta’ or ‘Dead Cow’. Currently, Argentina is one of a handful of 
countries in the world that has unconventional hydrocarbons ‘in production’. Its approach and its 
practices therefore make it an ideal case for studying practices that are likely to become a part of 
Shale 2.0. Secondly, we have selected Colombia, a country like Argentina with a civil law system, and 
one which has identified substantial resources to be exploited. It is developing a legal framework to 
facilitate this and is planning for exploration and production. Finally, we have selected The UK, a 
common law country,10 which became one of the first countries outside of the US to drill exploration 
wells in 2011; subsequently, a variety of obstacles from local government reviews to decisions to 
impose moratoria and even to ban shale gas developments, have slowed plans to drill wells and 
build a new industry. 
The case studies draw upon the synthetic analyses of national experts in energy law from 
the above three countries. Each case study covers five broad issues relevant to Shale 2.0 in a country 
                                                          
10 Scotland has a mixed common and civil law system but since it has effectively banned unconventional 
hydrocarbons activity, it is not considered in any detail in the parts of this paper that address the UK. 
setting: how the country and particularly its government reacted to Shale 1.0; what the existing 
hydrocarbons regime was like; what measures were taken to promote and regulate unconventional 
resources; the challenges that became evident and what solutions were developed locally to meet 
them, and an assessment of the emerging shape of regulation for Shale 2.0. Within each heading, 
there is some variation in the coverage given the evolving nature of the subject matter and the 
impact of circumstances, policy priorities or the state of sector development. Some concluding 
comments are made based on a comparative analysis of common features and contrasting 
approaches to the regulation of unconventional hydrocarbons (Section 6). 
Other countries might have been chosen of course, even though very few provide examples 
of production activity. A criterion that influenced our choice was the availability of reliable data 
relevant to an analysis of a regulatory regime for unconventional hydrocarbons. China has extensive 
deposits of shale gas and considerable potential, but we did not feel our access was likely to yield 
the quality of data that we were seeking.11 A further consideration was whether the hydrocarbons 
regime in a country was open to international investment: regimes which are closed are not likely to 
be influential on the development of transnational practice in this area. 
The comparisons and contrasts drawn out through these three country studies may yield 
fresh insights into this question of investment promotion in what we have called the Shale 2.0 
phase. In that sense, we aim to contribute to a growing body of multi-disciplinary scholarship 
                                                          
11 The emerging regime is strongly supported by both Central and Provincial government authorities through 
development planning and subsidies, with engineering services and infrastructure construction being built up 
to achieve energy security goals. BP appears to be the only IOC involved, with activity in shale gas dominated 
by Sinopec rather than Petrochina, the main gas producer (and BP’s partner). High costs, plus the need to drill 
beyond 3500 metres and the location of shale in blocks already licensed for conventional resource 
development are among the blocks to rapid development. For further published analysis, see Jianghua Chen, 
‘Shale Gas Exploration and Development Progress in China and the Way Forward’ (2018) IOP Conference 
Series: Earth Environ Sci 113 012178; PD Farah and R Tremolada, ‘A Comparison between Shale Gas in China 
and Unconventional Fuel Development in the United States: Water, Environmental Protection, and Sustainable 
Development’ (2016) Brooklyn J Int’l Law 580–654. Older, but informative analyses include: D Sandalow D and 
others, ‘Meeting China’s Shale Gas Goals’ Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy Research Report (2014), 
and Fan Gao, ‘Will there be a Shale Gas Revolution in China by 2020?’ Oxford Institute for Energy Studies NG 
61 (2012). 
surrounding unconventional oil and gas and the technologies that support it. Our aim of contributing 
to it springs from a belief that the body of knowledge required—if investment in the complex Shale 
2.0 context is ever likely to materialize—will be richer, deeper and more reflective in character than 
was evident in the making of Shale 1.0. One of the outcomes of that research could be the 
development of a body of standards, or ‘best international industry practice’ that may assist 
governments that seek to design or to benchmark regulatory regimes in this area. 
By way of a caveat, it should not be thought that the authors are unaware of the arguments 
‘against’ the development of shale oil and gas or that they are ‘advocates’ of such development in 
general or in any special context. Within the USA, the heart of Shale 1.0, there are influential bodies 
in several States that have acted to limit shale development, taking a critical view of the balance of 
costs and benefits. Indeed, there is a long tradition of imposing strict limits to conventional 
hydrocarbons or mining activities in certain areas such as national parks or urban areas with dense 
populations. The idea of imposing constraints is neither new nor unreasonable. It does not preclude 
development of hydrocarbons in other less socially or environmentally sensitive areas. In this case, 
the relative novelty of the application of several technologies, and their continued evolution and 
enhancement, means that regulation of unconventional hydrocarbons is likely to require periodic 
review to ensure it is appropriate to the kind of operations involved in their development. However, 
at this stage very little regulation has in fact been put in place outside of North America, and what 
exists is far from being tried and tested. The focus of this study lies then not in assessing the 
adequacy of an ‘established’ form of regulation but in tracking the evolution of national practices as 
the source of an emerging international best practice in what is still a relatively new area of energy 
law. 
2. SHALE 1.0 : THE US AS MODEL OR WARNING? 
Shale 1.0’s beating heart 
The narrative of unconventional energy’s growth in the US is a compelling one and has often 
been described.12 It forms an essential part of an already considerable literature on the various 
economic, technological and legal impacts of Shale 1.0.13 Its impact on the US economy has been 
dramatic: from being a country that was increasingly dependent on imports of oil and gas 
throughout the later 20th century, it has been transformed by the development of domestic 
unconventional oil and gas resources into one that is self-sufficient, and export-oriented. Its wider 
impacts on US industry have also been much commented upon. On some estimates, energy costs to 
US industry have dropped by a third while European competitors faced increases of more than 50 
per cent.14 The increased demand for metallic products, such as pipes and other equipment to allow 
the metallurgical industry to grow at a rapid rate: by 2011 ‘US Steel invested $95 million in an Ohio 
plant to help meet the demand from shale gas extraction activities . . .. Vallourec was spending $650 
million on a new plant in Ohio to supply steel pipe for companies extracting shale gas’.15 At the same 
time, opposition to the new industry has been intense and vocal from the outset, particularly in the 
more densely populated parts of the USA, driven by environmental concerns and leading to a lack of 
a ‘social licence to operate’ in some areas.16 
                                                          
12 For example, Gregory Zuckerman, The Frackers (Portfolio Penguin 2013); and Susan L Sakmar, ‘The Global 
Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the Role Model for the Development of Shale Gas around the 
World?’ University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No 2011-27. 
13 On taxation of shale gas, there is a comprehensive working paper from the International Monetary Fund: P 
Daniel and others, ‘How Should Shale Gas Extraction be Taxed?’ 
(<http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/11/16/How-Should-Shale-Gas-Extraction-Be-Taxed-
45410> accessed 12 July 2018). On the wider economic issues, examples are C Hausman and R Kellog, ‘Welfare 
and Distributional Implications of Shale Gas’. Working Paper 21, 115, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA (2015); C Mason, L Muelenbachs and S Olmstead, ‘The Economics of Shale Gas Development’ 
(2015) 7 Annual Review of Resource Economics 269–89. Impacts on energy markets are discussed in P Brehm, 
‘Natural Gas Prices, Electricity Generation Investment, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ Working Paper, 
University of Michigan (2015), and J Kepes, B Rodgers and P van Meurs, ‘Gas Prices, other Factors indicate 
Changes in North American/Shale Play Fiscal Systems’ (2011) 109 Oil and Gas Journal 56–66. Timothy 
Fitzgerald discusses the technological aspects of hydraulic fracturing: ‘Frackonomics: Some Economics of 
Hydraulic Fracturing’ (2013) 63 Case Western Reserve L Rev 1337–62. 
14 Ventocilla (2016), JWELB. 
15 PWC. Shale Gas: A renaissance in the US Manufacturing. 2011. 
16 The social licence to operate is the issue that Don Smith and others (2017) focus on and propose a model 
based on Colorado state practice to address this. 
This sudden complex change in the energy mix of the largest energy consumer in the world 
not only attracted international attention but was also coupled with publication of data suggesting 
that similar geological formations were present in many other parts of the world.17 If the geology 
was indeed favourable in terms of reserve quantity and accessibility, what conditions were required 
to replicate the shale energy revolution outside of North America, and would governments act to 
facilitate it? For many a policy-maker in energy importing countries, it seemed to offer a way of 
providing a secure and constant supply of hydrocarbons to their domestic industries and homes, and 
yet avoid the costs of importing energy. At the same time, media reports of popular concerns about 
its potential impacts encouraged many governments to impose prohibitions and similar constraints 
on prospective operations: in Bulgaria, France, Germany, Romania and South Africa, and at a 
subnational level in Australia, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK (Scotland, Wales) and the USA 
(including New York, Vermont and cities and counties in California, Colorado, Texas and Ohio). 
An enquiry into the ingredients for success and whether they could be replicated elsewhere 
lay behind much of the literature and media coverage of the ‘Shale Revolution’. Apart from geology, 
the key criteria seemed to be: economics, infrastructure availability, equipment and crucially, 
whether such activity was to be permitted by the government concerned. In the diverse and 
abundant commentary that has followed, we might distinguish two broad approaches:18 the first 
identified and examined the factors behind its success in the US (and largely ignored developments 
in Western Canada) and then asked how many of these were available ‘outside’ the US and whether 
the absence of any of them was significant; the second adopted a different approach and focussed 
on what ‘success’ meant in the US context, with a focus on the social cost and sometimes the tacit 
                                                          
17 The US Energy Information Administration analysed 48 shale gas basins in 32 countries and based on its 
estimates of technically recoverable reserves of shale gas in Europe, the European Centre for Energy and 
Resource Security argued that they had the potential to meet European gas demand for at least another 60 
years: Financial Times, 12 May 2011: Critics try to stifle the shale gas revolution. This data is probably 
incomplete and understates potential in the Middle East and some other source rocks for shale gas and shale 
oil. However, for data gathering purposes the next question is how much of this is commercially extractable at 
a certain price. 
18 See the citations in foregoing footnotes 1, 4, 9 and 12. 
question: can it last? While it is the first of these that concerns us in this article, in the next few 
paragraphs we shall briefly review each of these perspectives and what insights they have yielded. 
Characteristics of Shale 1.0 
The eight principal factors that contributed to the Shale Revolution in North America are usually 
thought to be the following19: 
 Private ownership of subsurface mineral rights—which permits surface access and limits 
legal challenges to rapid development (enabling legislation and regulations may serve to 
replicate this as an incentive but is unlikely to allow for the same degree of rapid 
development); 
 Independent gas companies with the necessary technical knowledge and the incentive to 
apply or develop it; and service companies. . . 
 Pre-existing pipeline infrastructure and capacity 
 Fairly abundant water supplies 
 Low population density—which limits public opposition 
 Deep capital markets 
 High natural gas prices, and gas demand 
 Royalties and taxes, which are sensitive to the unconventional net cash flow profile and cost 
base. 
The use of combined techniques, such as hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and seismic 
mapping, became a general practice in different areas of the USA during the decade from 1990 and 
led to better rates of production in 2003 and 2004.20 Unconventional resources had long been 
known but what was new was the application of hydraulic fracturing involving the opening of shale 
rock by means of the fracturing, then injecting thousands of tonnes of water, sand and other 
additives underground at high pressure. However, it was not until 2007 that a substantial growth in 
the production of hydrocarbons started to become relevant at the level of the national energy mix 
and initiated what at the time was often referred to as the ‘shale revolution’. At that time, 
production of shale gas reached 8 per cent of the total natural gas production in the USA, with 
significant impacts on the industry, the prices and the economy.21 
                                                          
19 The following list is a synthesis of similar lists in publications by P Stevens (2010) and P Daniel and others 
(2018). 
20 Around 2 billion cubic feet (BcF) per day from the Barnett Shale formation, overtaking the production from 
more traditional areas in the Appalachian basin in Ohio or the Michigan Basin. 
21 Last visited: <http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec2.pdf> accessed 12 July 2018. 
A switch from coal powered generation plants to gas powered ones followed: in 2001 only 17 
per cent of the power generated used gas as fuel, while coal was the main source for production 
with 51 per cent; by 2012, 31 per cent came from gas and 36 per cent came from coal.22 In 2010 
alone, 2200 MW of gas powered energy was introduced into the market, an equivalent of 84 per 
cent net new capacity.23 
While other factors may have affected the industry decision to change its fuel for electricity 
generation, the reduced price of gas was one of the main drivers for this change. Another 
contributing factor may have been the impact of policies to reduce CO2 emissions, which was 
adopted by environmental authorities in the US; this factor makes gas more advantageous than coal, 
from an environmental perspective. Academics have measured the potential impact that the 
reduction of emission by the changing on fuel for the generation of power to be between 35 per 
cent and 50 per cent from the national peak in 2005.24 
Another element that has been attributed to the increase of gas production caused by the shale 
gas exploration and production, is a phenomenon of regeneration and improvement in some 
industries that were in decline or had disappeared in the USA. The activities and effects of shale gas 
activity affected the economic performance of the states where the major formations were located, 
and where the activity and production were occurring. Increases in employment related to the 
industry or improvements on the general economic performance of towns, counties and states, are 
some of the positive effects that shale gas brought to the communities. 
Several studies have analysed the economic impact that the states and towns involved in the 
shale gas revolution have experienced. Some of them have initiated arguments on how the 
                                                          
22 A Yanagisawa, ‘Impacts of Shale Gas Revolution on Natural Gas and Coal Demand’ (2013) IEEJ. Another 
contributory factor is the need for renovation of non-efficient coal-powered plants. Due to several 
environmental regulations issued by the Environmental protection Agency, as well as the increase on efficiency 
of combined cycle gas turbine powered plants, has made that the switch from coal to gas, has been welcomed 
within a context of favourable fuel (gas) price. 
23 J Broderick and K Anderson, ‘Has US Shale Gas Reduced CO2 Emissions’ Tyndall Centre, 2012. 
24 ibid. 
measurement of the positive effect has been done, and how much of the actual benefit has a long-
lasting effect on the economy.25 Other studies with a more optimistic view base their conclusions on 
the increase on jobs, tax revenues and local or regional gross product. 
An example of this is the increase in number of jobs in the state of Pennsylvania with 29,000 
new jobs in 2008 and tax revenues of $238 million. A more general approach of the development of 
the Marcellus shale formation (including West Virginia and Pennsylvania), improved the gross 
regional product by $4.8 billion, created 57,000 new jobs and brought $1.7 billion in local, state and 
federal taxes, all in 2009. Texas and the development of the Barnett formation is another example 
where clear numbers illustrate the economic prosperity that shale gas has brought to some of the 
regions where it is developed. In Texas, in 2011, the regional output related with shale gas is of 
$1.11 billion equivalent to 8.1 per cent of the region’s economy, as well as 100,000 jobs, equivalent 
to 10 per cent of the employment of the region.26 
Critique of Shale 1.0 
Two strands of criticism emerged at an early stage. Too many of the ingredients of success were 
specific to the North American context and could not be replicated elsewhere. Furthermore, there 
were important negative environmental impacts of the shale technologies which would undermine 
social acceptance. 
On the first strand in the shale critique, there are many surface challenges that may prevent 
widespread development of shale potential in the US and beyond.27 If one looks to the US effort, the 
scale of the practical challenge becomes evident. In terms of the capital commitment, the success 
rate is around 10 per cent in developing new shale deposits or ‘plays’ in the US, with each play 
typically requiring 50–100 wells to ‘crack the code’ to commerciality and taking between 3 and 5 
                                                          
25 A Munasib and D Rickman, ‘Regional Economic Impacts of the Sale Gas and Tight Oil Boom: A Synthetic 
Control Analysis’ (2015) 50 Regional Science and Urban Economics. 
26 B Sovacool, ‘Cornucopia or Curse: Reviewing the Costs and Benefits of Shale Gas Hydraulic Fracturing 
(fracking)’ (2014) 37 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. 
27 Moyes & Co: AIPN Model Contracts Workshop, June 2015: Presentation on Unconventional Resources. 
years. Most of the plays fail in a range of between 5 and 15 wells drilled. For individual companies, 
this is a demanding requirement to have both capacity for the capital load and investors patient 
enough to wait for a return once commerciality is proven. For countries outside the US, this context 
is even more off-putting. One review of several areas: Argentina (Vaca Muerta), Australia (Cooper 
Basin) and China (Sichuan), concluded that outside of North America shale once produced is likely to 
prove expensive. 
The regulatory approach is replete with challenges if the US experience is an indicator. Firstly, 
there is a need to adapt any existing regime for conventional resources, including provision for an 
ability to hold undeveloped acreage positions and drill as needed to provide hydrocarbon volumes 
for a period of 40–60 years. Secondly, the regime needs to be able to process a high volume of 
permits and the relevant paperwork for drilling, completion and pipeline construction. Local councils 
need to be supportive of this activity. This social acceptance is key since the projects absorb copious 
quantities of sand and water and truckloads of equipment and liquids, causing significant disruption 
unless the areas are remote. Early evidence from the US suggests that the reinjection of produced 
water underground through disposal wells is responsible for the measurable rise in the number of 
earthquakes with a magnitude of 3.0 in the State of Oklahoma, for example.28 
However, there was also concern about negative effects peculiar to this manner of developing 
unconventional hydrocarbons. The main ones were: the risk of ground and surface water 
contamination arising from well integrity; the intense use of resources such as water and land; and 
the risk that induced seismic activity would cause earthquakes. 
Several concerns over the protection of aquifers and water resources have been identified by 
citizens and academics. Some argue that the fracturing process or the lack of stability of the wells, 
could lead to the contamination of water supplies from the filtration of chemical fluids used in the 
                                                          
28 ibid. From zero per annum the number of earthquakes increased to 584 in 2014. 
process.29 Others have raised concerns on the possibility of methane leaks into the atmosphere, 
creating another risk of air pollution.30 
Other potential risks associated with the production of unconventional hydrocarbons refer to 
the substantial use of water for the fracturing work, and to the use of that water, after it has been 
injected into the ground. The management and potential reuse of the water has caused concerns 
amongst the population and some organizations.31 
The final disposition of the produced water has become an issue, and in some states it has been 
reinjected into the ground. This practice and the fracturing of the underground, has been associated 
with the increase of tremors and seismic events in some states.32 
The abovementioned potential risks that have been associated with shale gas resources 
development have been addressed by federal and state governments. In principle, the development 
of environmental protection laws, regulations and guidelines can address the above risks, and the 
ones adopted in the US may provide a lead in their design for application in other jurisdictions. 
However, from a legal point of view, fracking can also generate litigation such as claims that 
plaintiffs have suffered personal injuries because of pollutants released because of fracking 
operations. This could arise from the release of chemical compounds into the air or fracking fluids 
leaking into the soil and well water. A more complex problem arises from the long-term effects of 
these processes and the legacy of defunct operations many years later. 
What’s it all about? Thinking beyond Shale 1.0 
In using the term Shale 1.0, we are not only characterizing the immense increase in production in gas 
and oil that was evident in the USA, and the legal frameworks that made it possible. In our view, it 
                                                          
29 Vengosh and others, ‘The Effects of Shale Gas exploration and Hydraulic Fracturing on the Quality of Water 
Resources in the USA’ (2013) 7 Procedia Earth and Planetary Science. 
30 Carnegie Mellon University. Shale Gas and the Environment: Critical Need for a Government-University- 
Industry Research Initiative. 2013. 
31 Groundwater Protection council. US Produced Water Volumes and Management. 2012. 
32 WL Ellsworth, ‘Injection-Induced Earthquakes’ (2013) 341 Science. 
also refers to the body of scholarly research and legal analysis that it triggered in many countries. 
This involved academics, legal professionals, government bodies, scientific associations, 
international organizations and industry associations. The body of knowledge about unconventional 
resources has grown at an exponential rate in the past decade. Ironically, outside of North America 
shale activity has evolved at a pace far slower than the volume of literature on the subject. A great 
deal has been written on the evolving legal regimes in various country settings.33 
Moving beyond shale 1.0: adapting regulation and contracts 
It is perhaps unsurprising that despite the differences between unconventional and conventional 
hydrocarbon resources, the legal and regulatory frameworks that have been initially designed for 
unconventional energy have been closely modelled on their tried and tested counterparts for 
conventional sources of energy. Since the economics and the extraction techniques are different, it 
is to be expected that the legal regimes will ‘eventually’ be adapted to reflect this. Indeed, lawyers, 
commercial negotiators and advisers with industry clients have been among early commentators on 
the legal implications of the specific features of unconventional energy resources.34 In spite of the 
fact of state ownership and extensive control in most countries, the design of rules for the energy 
industry in a new field is not only a matter for governments. Some early attempts at designing 
common frameworks have already emerged from industry associations and regional bodies. 
                                                          
33 There are many examples, but a few are given below: W Baginski, ‘Shale Gas in Poland – The Legal 
Framework for Granting Concessions for Prospecting and Exploration of Hydrocarbons’ (2011) 32 Energy L J 
145; Mostafa I Elshazly, ‘The Legal and Contractual Framework pertaining to the Exploration and Production of 
Shale Gas in Egypt’ (2015) 8 JWELB 385–90; David AW Maloney, ‘Unconventional Oil and Gas in Australia: A 
Case of Regulatory Lag’ 33 J Energy & Natural Resources L 349–404; Brian J Preston, ‘Unconventional Natural 
Gas in the Courts: An Overview’ (2014) 32 J Energy & Natural Resources L 377–424; an overview of the regimes 
in place in many countries was compiled by the law firm, Baker and McKenzie: Shale Gas: An International 
Guide (2nd edn 2014). 
34 In a two-part article, Peter Roberts examined how a conventional joint operating agreement would need to 
be modified to reflect the nuances of an on-land shale gas project: ‘UK Shale Gas Prospects – Preparing 
Bespoke Joint Operating Agreements and Gas Sales Agreements’ (2013 and 2014) 31 and 32 J Energy & Natural 
Resources L 407–24 and 41–57; the Baker & McKenzie study on Shale (2014) discusses this as does the 
guidance to the AIPN UROA (see Trinh Chubbock, ‘The First AIPN Model Contract for Unconventional Resource 
Operations’ (2014): <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=535b3956-b32d-4498-9065-
f37de5fadb31>) accessed 12 July 2018. 
An early example of the focus on specifics of the new unconventional sector was the 2014 
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) adaptation of its Model International Joint 
Operating Agreement (2012) for potential use in connection with unconventional resource deposits. 
It also issued Guidance on the use of the Unconventional Resources Operating Agreement (UROA). 
More than 160 industry representatives from 26 countries were involved in drafting this model, the 
first of its kind. It covers joint operations in shale oil and gas, tight oil and gas, coalbed methane and 
other unconventional production methodologies involving wellbore operations. The modifications 
consider key differences unique to unconventional resources such as pilot projects, sub-areas, multi-
pad drilling and production, and other features of horizontal drilling. This was—and is—an attempt 
to developing in a prospective way a measure of standardization in transnational contractual 
practice. 
Among the features of unconventional resources that require some special consideration by 
governments in adapting their existing regime design from conventional to unconventional resource 
development are the following four35: 
Operational considerations. The higher density of wells and on-land base for exploration, 
appraisal, development and production operations leads to a greater demand for land access 
authorizations and operational permits. A well for shale gas will typically run vertically down to the 
shale layer for about a mile and then extend horizontally, possibly for as much as two miles, 
potentially going under the land of many owners. 
Environment and social regulation. The potential impact and perceived risks on the surface 
land, air quality, and underground water resources mean that regulation is required. In practice, the 
risks of groundwater contamination from the fracking process itself are likely to be less common 
than those arising from improperly managed sludge and fracking pits and improperly disposed 
fracking fluids. Such fluids typically contain methane, ethane, and volatile organic compounds, which 
                                                          
35 P Cameron and M Stanley, The Extractive Industries Source Book (The World Bank 2017). 
may be hazardous to health if not contained and disposed of during fracking operations. Air 
pollution may also arise from inadvertent venting of substances into the atmosphere and affecting 
the quality of air in the surrounding areas. 
Fiscal incentives. These are required when the cost of unconventional operations is 
substantially higher than for conventional ones. This could mean reduced royalty rates, a tax credit 
or more favourable schemes for cost recovery, and a profit gas split. This approach is less justified if 
there is an additional profits tax or a profit-sharing scheme in place, because in that event the 
economic criterion on which it is typically based will allow for an automatic integration of the 
economic differences between conventional and unconventional gas. 
Licensing systems. Adjustments would be needed to existing provisions on exploration and 
appraisal periods, work commitments, the definition of an unconventional gas field and submission 
of development plans. Where rights have already been awarded specifically for conventional 
petroleum or coal exploration and production in a given area, new rules may allow the award of 
separate rights for unconventional resources. In Indonesia, for example, regulations give a priority 
access to holders of existing rights if they wish to seek rights over unconventional resources. The PSC 
for coal bed methane has a term of 30 years, including an initial exploration term of 6 years, which 
may be extended by four years for assessing the viability of a commercial coal-bed methane project. 
Indeed, industry associations have played a key role in establishing a body of good 
international petroleum practice since the earliest days of conventional hydrocarbons development. 
In another example of a recent initiative by industry, a body known as the UK Onshore Operators 
Group (UKOOG) has published the ‘UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines’, setting out best practice 
for shale well operations.36 
                                                          
36 UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines: Exploration and Appraisal Phase, 2013: 
<http://www.ukoog.org.uk/images/ukoog/pdfs/ShaleGasWellGuidelines.pdf>: ‘the initial operations will be 
treated as a pilot to ensure that high standards of safety and environmental management are achieved and to 
enable the guidelines to be fully evaluated’. The Guidelines are careful to emphasize that they are limited in 
At an early stage the question was raised of whether a regional framework for shale 
development could emerge on a European basis led by European Union institutions. In 2011, a 
report was submitted to the European Commission that examined various aspects of unconventional 
gas in the European context.37 No commercial scale shale gas production was in place at the time. 
The EU had begun deliberations on possible actions to take, probably with the aim of proposing a 
harmonized regime across the EU.38 However, Article 194 of the Treaty for the European Union gives 
each Member State the right ‘to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy sources, its 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply’. This shared 
competence between the Member State and the EU institution created obstacles for regulatory 
action in this new field,39 making any binding measures difficult to secure approval for. In January 
2014, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation setting out minimum principles for 
Member States when applying or adapting their legislation on conventional hydrocarbons to shale 
operations.40 The thrust is to safeguard public health, climate and the environment, to ensure that 
resources are used efficiently and to keep the public informed of the activities. It was adopted 
according to Article 292 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and is not 
                                                          
scope to the first two phases of shale activity and are the first iteration, to be modified in the light of 
knowledge gained from the experience of initial operations. 
37 Philippe & Partners, Final Report on Unconventional Gas in Europe: 8 November 2011. The main purpose of 
the Study was ‘to analyse how the relevant applicable European legal framework, including environmental law, 
is applied to the licensing/authorisation and operational permitting for prospection, exploration and 
production/exploitation of shale gas based on a sample of four Member States, i.e. Poland, France, Germany 
and Sweden’ (p 5). Since that time there has been further research into the European regulatory framework: 
for example, L Reins, Regulating Shale Gas – the Challenge of Coherent Environmental and Energy Regulation 
(Edward Elgar 2017). 
38 The European Parliament Briefing of December 2014 summarizes the energy security aspect behind this 
debate: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/542167/EPRS_BRI(2014)542167_REV1_EN.pdf> 
accessed 12 July 2018. 
39 K de Smedt and A Rigamonti, ‘Towards a Common Framework for Shale Gas Extraction in the EU’ (2013) 21 
Env Liability: Law, Policy and Practice 145–53: ‘Ultimately, it will be the Member States that will decide to 
engage in shale gas exploration and extraction’ (at 153). 
40 Recommendation 2014/17/EU: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.039.01.0072.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2014:039:TOC> accessed 12 July 
2018. A Communication was issued at the same time, providing background to the Recommendation and its 
assumptions: COM (2014) 23 final/2: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0023R(01)&from=EN> accessed 12 July 2018. 
legally binding on Member States. Divergent approaches to shale development among the Member 
States and partners seem very likely to result from this approach, particularly after the impact of the 
UK exit from the EU. 
Conclusions 
From the above overview—which makes no claims to being comprehensive—it should be 
clear that the body of knowledge that exists for designing laws and key contractual documents for 
unconventional resource activity is already evolving. The remarkably slow expansion of shale activity 
almost everywhere in the world contrasts markedly with its resilience in the US. However, there is a 
difference between a slow emergence and no emergence at all. Despite the many moratoria and 
prohibitions in countries around the world, there are several areas in which it is being encouraged by 
governments not least for reasons of energy security policy. The probability that it will not resemble 
the US industry is hardly an indicator that it will fail to emerge. 
In 2018 alone, as prices rise once again, there have been some notable relevant 
developments. Apart from the discovery of what appear to be significant deposits of unconventional 
gas in Bahrain, mentioned earlier, there is a growing expansion of shale gas in China and a recent 
report in the industry’s potential in Australia’s Northern Territory argued that the risks can be 
adequately managed.41 
In the following sections, the legal development of shale resources in three countries will be 
presented in a case study format, noting how the regulatory structures have evolved and how the 
authorities have addressed their own local problems to facilitate a contribution of shale to their 
energy mix. 
                                                          
41 Oil and Gas Journal, 9 April 2018: ‘Fracking inquiry report handed to Northern Territory’. 
3. CASE STUDY 1: ARGENTINA 
Reacting to Shale 1.0 
Among the countries that have sought to replicate the US ‘shale revolution’, Argentina stands out. 
The country is ranked in the ‘top 5’ in terms of global shale oil and gas endowment and is a potential 
shale ‘giant’. Building on the geology, the government has taken steps to introduce special 
contractual arrangements for unconventional resource development and generally to provide legal 
and economic stability to investors. Progress in developing the Vaca Muerte or ‘Dead Cow’ 
formation in the Province of Neuquen has been rapid despite logistical issues (infrastructure, skills 
and the modest size of the oil services sector, for example) and—in the background—some tensions 
between the federal and provincial authorities over their respective competencies. With the 
prospect of exporting gas to Chile, the country could become an energy hub in Latin America. 
Even while the geology was present from the very beginning in Argentina, the industry—
comprising majors and independents—took the view that they had to ‘crack its code’. Four years of 
intense initial exploration followed, with more than 800 drilled wells: 629 with oil/condensate 
production and 497 all in only one block and 549 operated by the state company, YPF; 137 wells with 
dry and wet shale gas production, and 98 in effective production. The learning curve of the Vaca 
Muerta shale play has probably reached its peak. As Table 1 illustrates, productivity rates of 
horizontal wells aiming to extract hydrocarbons from the ‘Dead Cow’ have been increasing year on 
year and match those of the US shale plays. 
However, in policy terms Argentina has had to accompany this activity with some significant 
wider economic reforms to secure further investment into its economy. From 2016 onwards, 
features of the macroeconomic context included the Administration’s settlement of the public debt 
arising from the ‘holdouts’, elimination of foreign exchange restrictions, reduction of inflation, and 
importantly, ensuring that these measures were explained as part of a wider attempt to regain 
credibility with the international investment community. 
From a sector standpoint, the Government was active in progressing the ‘to do list’ 
requested by energy experts and industry players: it introduced a ‘contract-for-differences’ scheme 
that guarantees a minimum price for shale or tight gas; it pushed for an amendment to the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement between oil companies and oil workers that slashes labour costs; it 
eliminated export taxes on hydrocarbons; it is overhauling the import regime for equipment and 
consumables required to develop oil fields; and it is investing heavily to improve the roads and 
railways connecting Vaca Muerta s fields with the supply chain and domestic market. 
The legal and policy framework 
Since the first discovery of oil in 1907 there has been an ongoing controversy between the Federal 
Government and the provinces regarding the eminent domain of the hydrocarbon reserves and the 
authority to legislate on the matter. The Constitution delegated to the Federal Government (ie 
Congress and implementing regulations issued by the Executive Branch) the authority to establish 
the substantive rules governing the exploration and production of crude oil and gas, thus ensuring 
the uniformity of legislation.42 However, despite this clarity about legislative power, the eminent 
domain of the hydrocarbons reserves has shifted between the provinces and the Federal 
Government, and this has had practical consequences for the grant of exploitation concessions and 
exploration permits, the collection of royalties and the level of involvement of the national and 
provincial authorities. In the most recent iteration of this pendulum swing, a Constitutional 
amendment in 1994 allowed the provinces to recover ownership rights over the natural resources 
found in their territory.43 
Since the enactment of Law 26,197 in December 2006 (the Re-Provincialization Law), the 
provinces became the enforcement authority of the Federal Hydrocarbons Law (FHL)44 within their 
                                                          
42 See art 75 subsection 12 of the Argentine Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court, interpreting this 
constitutional provision, held that the power delegated to the Federal Government to legislate on mining 
refers to all types of mines, among which hydrocarbon fields are included (see Rulings 301:341 and 311:1265). 
43 See art 124 of the Argentine Constitution. 
44 Law No 17,319. 
relevant jurisdictions.45 While the Re-Provincialization Law expressly maintains the uniformity of 
substantive legislation by keeping the effectiveness of the FHL and its implementing rules and by 
requiring the provinces to abide by such regulation, it recognizes several rights as vesting in the 
Provinces, including the following:46 
i. To grant new exploration permits and production concessions over the 
hydrocarbons located within their territories; 
ii. To extend the terms of the current and new permits, concessions and contracts; 
iii. To approve their assignment; 
iv. To revoke the same upon material breaches or causes set forth in the FHL; 
v. To impose penalties; and, 
vi. To exercise, in general, all the powers inherent to their condition as Enforcement 
Authority. 
The Federal Government preserves all such rights in relation to off-shore blocks beyond 12 
miles.47 Finally, in line with the principle set out in the Constitution and the FHL, the Re-
Provincialization Law vests in the Federal Executive Branch the sole authority to design the federal 
energy policies.48 
Regulating to promote unconventional hydrocarbons 
Exploitation concessions 
The FHL conceives a system of exploration permits and production concessions awarded by the State 
(Federal or Provincial, depending on the location of the deposits), under which companies hold 
exclusive rights to explore, develop, exploit and take title to the production at the well-head, in 
consideration for a royalty and the application of the general taxation regime.49 As mentioned 
above, the FHL was amended in 2014 to create a new type of concession: the unconventional 
exploitation concession. 
The procedure for awarding exploration permits and production concessions over new 
blocks (other than those concessions resulting from an exploration permit or a subdivision of an 
                                                          
45 See art 2 of the Re-Provincialization Law. 
46 See art 2 first and third paragraphs and art 6 of the Re-Provincialization Law. 
47 See art 1 of Federal Hydrocarbons Law as amended by art 1 second paragraph of the Re-Provincialization 
Law. 
48 See art 3 of the Federal Hydrocarbons and art 2 fourth paragraph of the Re-Provincialization Law. 
49 See ss 2, 3 and 6 of Title II of the FHL. 
existing concession) is by means of a public tender, and the criteria for selecting a bid must be the 
value of the work commitments.50 However, leaving to one side any special cases that may involve a 
bidding process on vacant areas of provenreserves51 and those involving a transfer of shares in 
already existing concessionaires of areas,52 an unconventional production concession may be 
acquired through the ownership of (a) an exploration permit or (b) a conventional concession, 
without the need for bidding in either case.53 If this happens, the exploitation concessionaire, within 
the concession area, may require the subdivision of the existing area into new areas of 
unconventional hydrocarbon exploitation and the granting of a new Unconventional Exploitation 
Concession of Hydrocarbons.54 Likewise, holders of an unconventional production concession who 
are, in turn, holders of an adjacent and pre-existing conventional concession may request the 
unification of both areas as a single unconventional production concession, ‘provided that the 
geological continuity of these areas is clearly demonstrated’.55 
Exploration permits are granted for periods up to 11 years in respect of conventional on-
shore blocks and 13 years in the case of unconventional on-shore blocks. Periods are divided into 
three phases. In the case of exploration carried out in the Continental Shelf and territorial sea, each 
of the foregoing basic terms for exploration with conventional purpose may be increased by one 
additional year. Work commitments (including drilling commitments) are assumed in connection 
with each phase. Extensions for up to 5 years to be divided between the second and third phase are 
admissible.56 
                                                          
50 art 45 FHL. 
51 The second paragraph of art 29 of the Hydrocarbons Law establishes ‘[t]he Federal or Provincial Executive 
Branch, as the case may be, may [. . .] award exploitation concessions over proven zones to persons who 
comply with the requirements and the proceedings included in Part 5 [Awards] of this Title’. 
52 The first paragraph of art 72 of the Hydrocarbons Law provides the following: ‘Concessions and permits 
awarded pursuant to this law may be assigned, with the prior authorization of the Executive Branch, to such 
persons that that qualify and comply with the conditions and requirements established for the concessionaires 
or permit holders, as the case may be.’ 
53 See art 27, para 2, of the Hydrocarbons Law, incorporated by art 4 of Law 27,007. 
54 See art 27 bis of the Hydrocarbons Law. 
55 See ibid, second paragraph, of the Hydrocarbons Law. 
56 See art 23 FHL. 
Upon the expiration of each exploration phase (and completion of the respective 
exploratory commitments), the holder of the exploration permit may choose to either withdraw or 
pursue the next phase. However, to enter the next phase, the permit holder must relinquish 50 per 
cent of the remaining acreage covered by the permit.57 If the holder of an exploration permit 
discovers commercially exploitable quantities of oil or gas, the holder may apply for, and is entitled 
to receive, an exclusive concession for the production and the development of such oil and gas.58 
A production concession vests in the holder the exclusive right to produce oil and gas, and 
take title to it at the well-head, from the area covered by the concession for a specific term for each 
type of concession (plus, in certain cases, a part of the unexpired portion of the underlying 
exploration permit), which may be extended.59 A production concession also entitles the holder to 
obtain a transportation concession for the oil and gas produced.60 
Conventional exploitation concessions are subject to a 25-year term, while unconventional 
exploitation concession last for 35 years—including a Pilot Period of up to 5 years, to be defined by 
the concessionaire and approved by the Enforcement Authority at the time of the initiation of the 
concession—and off-shore exploitation concessions are subject to a 30-year period.61 
In practice, the FHL divides the exploitation phase for unconventional hydrocarbons into two 
phases: first, a ‘Pilot Period’ that may not exceed 5 years, and second, a ‘Development Period’ that 
(in conjunction with the ‘Pilot Period’) may extend up to 35 years (plus any applicable extension). 
When the FHL defines ‘Pilot Project’ in its Article 27bis, it establishes that ‘the purpose [of the “Pilot 
Project”] is to determine the commercial exploitation of the discovered field’. In other words, the 
Pilot Project is needed to confirm (or not) that full scale of the unconventional field is commercially 
                                                          
57 See art 26 FHL. 
58 See art 17 FHL. 
59 See art 35 FHL. 
60 See art 28 FHL. 
61 See art 35 FHL. 
feasible. Thus, if the concessionaire decides to move to the development phase, it shall have to 
report to the Province the successful results of the Pilot Project. 
Finally, Article 35 of the FHL allows holders of exploitation concessions to apply for and 
obtain multiple and unlimited 10-year extensions, provided that: 
• They have complied with their obligations; 
• They are producing hydrocarbons in the relevant block; and 
• They submit an investment plan that is consistent with the development of the concession. 
The relevant extension request must be submitted no later than one year prior to the 
expiration of the concession. 
Pursuant to the FHL, a 12 per cent royalty payment is required to be made in the jurisdiction 
in which the operations take place.62 Royalties are calculated on the proceeds from the sale of 
hydrocarbons (minus certain discounts reflecting a net-back to the well-head). Payments in kind may 
be negotiated with the respective province. Although payments of royalties are not computed 
because of taxes, they qualify as a deductible expense for income tax purposes.63 Upon each 
extension, the royalty rates will increase 3 per cent up to a maximum of 18 per cent. 
Midstream concessions 
If the Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas production is to benefit from the above regulatory regime with 
its special treatment of unconventional resources, it needs to address a different, non-legal problem: 
a bottle neck in existing capacity of gas and crude oil pipelines. 
In Argentina, the development of pipelines to transport crude oil, natural gas liquids, 
condensate and other liquid by-products from production areas to market is governed by the FHL, 
while the development of natural gas pipelines is governed by the FHL and the Gas Law (GL). 
The legal system conceives the hydrocarbons exploitation concessionaire (liquids and 
natural gas) (also referred as producer or operator) as the ‘originator’ (also referred as ‘sponsor’ or 
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63 ibid art 56(c) VII. 
‘initiator’) of the legal title or license that grants the rights (i) to eminent domain to condemn a right 
of way easement along the proposed route, (ii) to build, operate and maintain the pipeline, and (iii) 
to transport its production up to the market or connection with a main trunk pipeline; for a period 
equivalent to the term of their exploitation concessions (25 or 35 years depending on the nature of 
the concession—conventional or unconventional hydrocarbons—, plus potential multiple 10-year 
extensions). 
This means that except as described below, an exploitation concessionaire is the only entity 
entitled to request (and obtain) a ‘transportation concession’. It is also the only entity entitled to a 
preferential right over the pipeline’s capacity to transport its own hydrocarbons (liquid and gas) 
production, being forced to grant open access to third parties exclusively in respect of any vacant 
capacity. In any case, a transportation concessionaire servicing third parties may only charge a 
regulated tariff established by the State. 
An independent midstream company may not request (and obtain) a transportation 
concession, except for two alternatives: (i) winning a public auction in which the State awards a 
transportation concession over a specific route (eg the case of the Oldelval pipeline), or (ii) acquiring 
the transportation concession from the exploitation concessionaire by way of an assignment 
agreement duly approved by the State (eg the case of the Pacifico pipeline or the Atacama pipeline). 
In both cases, the midstream company shall charge its customers a regulated tariff. Furthermore, in 
these situations the midstream company will not enjoy the preferential right that the originator—
exploitation concessionaire held at the inception. 
However, if, even under those arrangements, midstream companies are willing to invest in 
liquid pipelines, they face a development obstacle. Currently, liquid pipelines operate under a 
‘common carrier’ system (relatively like the US system that is governed by the Interstate Commerce 
Act). Except for the preferential right of the originator—exploitation concessionaires—for 
transporting its own production, transportation concessionaires must provide a transportation 
service to any party that reasonably requests service. This means that if a pipeline is constrained and 
a new customer asks for transportation service, the oil pipeline’s capacity must be allocated among 
its customers—including the new customer—and the existing customers all lose some of the 
capacity they otherwise would have had. 
In contrast, on a gas pipeline, service is provided to customers on a ‘contract carriage’ basis 
that entitles customers to firm capacity on the pipeline (relatively similar than the US system 
governed by the Natural Gas Act). If a new customer requests service on a constrained gas pipeline, 
the pipeline would not be required to provide service to the new customer. Firm contracts are 
assigned through an Open Season mechanism governed by the GL and stewarded by the ENARGAS. 
In an approach that contrasts with the US, the State does not require the pipeline to reserve 
some portion of its capacity for allocation among spot or ‘walk-up’ shippers, but instead authorizes 
that 100 per cent of capacity be allocated to committed or contract shippers. Officials at the Ministry 
of Energy and Mining have publicly stated that a new regulation establishing a ‘contract carriage’ 
system for liquid hydrocarbon pipelines coupled with an Open Season mechanism will be issued 
during 2018. If this reform is introduced, it would be well received by the oil and gas sector. ‘Without 
it, project sponsors lack certainty as to the revenue they will be able to generate once the pipeline is 
completed, as well as the service terms that the pipeline will be required to offer.’ 
Challenges and locally crafted solutions 
Foreign influence 
In contrast to the US shale revolution in which the US-based independents led the quest, the 
corporate pioneers in Vaca Muerta were foreign-owned companies, and usually the largest 
internationally operating ones. They also have the leading role on the legal expertise required to 
carry out such a sophisticated project. In July 2017, a joint venture formed by Total, Wintershall, Pan 
American Energy (PAE) and YPF (the state hydrocarbons company) signed a multi-project package 
deal that commits, in aggregate, more than one billion dollars to be invested in three different 
blocks: Aguada de Castro, Aguada Pichana Este and Aguada Pichana Oeste. 
The transaction was innovative in several ways: 
• Block split: the parties originally held interests in a historical gas field awarded during the 
early 1990s called Aguada Pichana of approximately 338,000 acres. The parties, under 
Total’s operatorship, had mainly developed the eastern side of the block with conventional 
and tight gas projects. To maximize investment and acreage development, the parties 
subdivided the block in two (Aguada Pichana Oeste and Aguada Pichana Este). Total 
continued as operator of the east (approximately 188,000), while PAE became operator of 
the west (approximately 150,000 acres). 
• Horizontal severance: In Aguada Pichana Este, given that the joint venture had already de-
risked the conventional and tight prospects, the parties agreed a horizontal severance of the 
block. While the conventional and tight gas prospects continue under the existing 
participating interests, the parties will have different interests in the new shale prospects. 
• Equity swaps: the parties, in different proportions, had interests in two blocks (Aguada de 
Castro and Aguada Pichana) that were converted in three blocks due to the subdivision of 
the former and, de-facto into four blocks, given the horizontal severance of Aguada Pichana 
Este. 
• Infrastructure usage: with the aim of reducing development costs of non-de-risked fields 
such as Aguada de Castro and Aguada Pichana Oeste and taking advantage of infrastructure 
existing capacity in Aguada Pichana Este, the parties agreed the use of the facilities existing 
in Aguada Pichana Este by the parties developing the Aguada de Castro and Aguada Pichana 
Oeste. 
Local content 
Local content within the oil and gas industry is generally recognized as a form of intervention by 
government that has the aim of ensuring that most of the goods and services required at each stage 
of the oil and gas value chain are locally supplied. In Argentina there is a ‘Purchase Vaca Muerta’ 
(Compre Vaca Muerta), a local content policy designed by the Province of Neuque´n that requires 
exploration and production (E&P) companies and major service companies with activity in Neuque´n 
to prioritize local suppliers with the aim of boosting local supply chain development. 
The ‘Purchase Neuquino’, sets out a local content policy that will accompany the industry’s 
growth. The legal framework for this is composed by: (i) Provincial Law 2755 dated 14 December 
2010 (‘Law 2, 755’)64; (ii) Supplementary Decree 2379 dated 28 December 2012 (‘Decree 2, 379’)65; 
                                                          
64 See text in Spanish at <http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/marcoLegal.php> accessed 12 July 2018. 
65 See text in Spanish at <http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/pdf/D_2379_2012.PDF> accessed 12 July 2018. 
and (iii) the ‘Proceeding for the Monitoring and Control of Procurement under Law 2, 755’ dated 1 
June 2014 (the ‘Proceeding’).66 
Enforcement authority. The Enforcement Authority of the ‘Purchase Neuquino’ is the Centro 
PyMEADENEU,67 which stands for Centre for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises—Agency for the 
Economic Development of Neuquén (Centro de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa—Agencia de 
Desarrollo Económico del Neuquén). The Director is Mr Facundo Lopez Raggi.68 A key question in the 
near term—and not one that can be answered yet—will be the effectiveness of this body given the 
ambition in the policy itself. 
Preference for local suppliers. E&P and major service companies must give preference to local 
suppliers (‘Empresas Neuquinas’) when procuring goods and services.69 Such preference must be 
granted to local suppliers (‘Empresas Neuquinas’) when their price is lower, equal or a 7 per cent 
higher than the price offered by a non-local supplier, in respect of identical or similar good or 
service.70 
Such preference is only applicable to a 60 per cent of the ‘total contracted amount for each 
category or activity’.71For instance, if US$100,000 were allocated to transportation services, a 60 per 
cent of such amount would be subject to the ‘priority’ established in the ‘Purchase Neuquino’, while 
the remaining 40 per cent would be freely allocated to non-local suppliers. 
                                                          
66 See text in Spanish at <http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/app/?page=Operadora.Login> accessed 12 July 
2018. 
67 See s 11 of Law 2755. 
68 See website at <http://cvh.cpymeadeneu.com.ar/index.php> accessed 12 July 2018. 
69 See s 1 of Law 2755. See also s 1 of Decree 2379 that clarifies that the service companies included in the 
‘Purchase Neuquino’ are those ‘contractors directly retained’ by E&P companies (such as Halliburton, 
Schlumberger, Weatherford, etc.), thus excluding any subcontractors. 
70 See s 9 of Law 2755. 
71 This is the official criterion of the Enforcement Authority for assessing the fulfilment of the mandatory 60% 
(see s 4.3.2., para 1, when it states that ‘el monitoreo y seguimiento de la aplicación de las prioridades de 
contratación se efectuará sobre el total del monto contratado para cada uno de los rubros o tipo de actividades 
requeridas’). However, it is worth noting that, when determining the base for assessing the fulfilment of the 
mandatory 60%, s 8 of Law 2755 refers to the ‘totality of the contracted services and goods’ (in Spanish: ‘Este 
sesenta por ciento (60%) sera tomado del total de los servicios o bienes por los cuales se contrata’). 
The Enforcement Authority has published a chart to exemplify the method it will use for assessing 
the mandatory 60 per cent:72 
 
If the service or good to be contracted, hired or purchased is indivisible, the priority shall be 
of 100 per cent.73 If it were to be possible, due to the nature and purpose of the relevant good or 
service, the agreement executed with the local supplier (‘Empresa Neuquina’) must be in effect for 
at least one year.74 The Enforcement Authority shall assess the fulfilment of the mandatory 60 per 
cent on the basis of yearly periods beginning on 1 January and ending on 31 December of each 
year.75 
Categories. The Enforcement Authority has included the following categories within the ‘Purchase 
Neuquino’:76 
1. Oil Services on the field; 
2. Civil Engineering and Works; 
3. Electro-mechanic Engineering and Works; 
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4. Transportation Services; 
5. Metal-mechanic Engineering, Works and Goods; 
6. IT and communications; 
7. Maintenance of service stations; 
8. Environmental services; 
9. Consulting services; and 
10. Other services. 
Excluded goods and services. Due to a lack of their availability in the Province of Neuquén, the 
Enforcement Authority has excluded the following goods and services from the ‘Purchase 
Neuquino’:77 
Category (1): Oil Services on the field 
• Seismic services 
• Underbalance drilling services 
• Well-head services 
• Cementing services 
• Cementing and stimulation services 
• Coiled tubing services 
• Services with automatic drilling equipment 
• Services with drilling rigs 
• Work-over services 
• Stimulation services 
• Supply of drilling/completion fluids 
• Supply of special products on field (chemicals, proppants, sand, cementing products, etc.) (to be     
assessed depending on the product) 
• Treatment of waste 
• Well logging and casing services 
• Directional drilling services 
• Heat tracing services 
• Top drive services 
Category (3): Electro-mechanic Engineering and Works 
• Maintenance of power generators 
• Maintenance of real-time operating systems (RTOS) 
• Operating and maintenance of gas plants 
Category (4): Transportation Services 
• Air transportation 
Category (5): Metal-mechanic Engineering, Works and Goods 
• Repair service of turbo-compressors (to be assessed on a case-by-case basis) 
• Maintenance and repair of valves (to be assessed on a case-by-case basis) 
• Operation and maintenance of pumping stations 
Category (10): Other Services 
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• Supply of satellite television 
• Supply of grid power 
• Supply of gas compression services. 
The budget allocated by E&P and large service companies to the excluded goods and 
services does not count for purposes of assessing the mandatory 60 per cent.78 For instance, if the 
budget for E&P is US$50 million and US$45 million are allocated to the excluded goods and services, 
only the remaining US$5 million allocated to goods and services included in the ‘Purchase Neuquino’ 
will count for assessing the mandatory 60 per cent. Therefore, US$3 million should be allocated to 
local suppliers. 
Beneficiaries (‘Empresas Neuquinas’). The ‘Purchase Neuquino’ benefits local suppliers (individuals 
or legal entities) who complied with certain requirements to qualify as an ‘empresa neuquina’, 
including:79 
• The domicile and main seat of business must be located in the Province of Neuquén for 5 
years before the enactment of Law 2755 (i.e. December 2005). 
• A 70 per cent of the capital stock must be owned by individuals or legal entities domiciled 
or registered in Neuquén. In the case of joint ventures, a 70 per cent of it must be controlled 
by a local supplier. 
Any local company directly or indirectly controlled by national or foreign companies will not 
qualify as a local supplier (‘empresa neuquina’).80 To enjoy the benefits of the ‘Purchase Neuquino’, 
local suppliers must submit before E&P companies and major service companies a certificate issued 
by the Enforcement Authority that expressly qualifies the local supplier as an ‘empresa neuquina’. 
Such certificate must be renewed on a yearly basis.81 
Reporting obligations. The Enforcement Authority may request to the E&P companies and major 
service companies’ information and documentation, or conduct audits, regarding their fulfilment of 
the ‘Purchase Neuquino’.82 E&P companies and major service companies must report to the 
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Enforcement Authority any call for bids for the award of a contract, work or service. The 
Enforcement Authority may publish those calls for bids in its website.83 
Penalties. Any company not complying with a requirement of the Enforcement Authority shall be 
warned. If the breach is not cured, the Enforcement Authority may establish a fine ranging from 
US$7000 and US$60,000, upon conducting an administrative proceeding that guarantees the right of 
defence of the company.84 If the company does not reach the mandatory 60 per cent, it may submit 
before the Enforcement Authority a plan detailing the objectives and points of action to be 
implemented in order to fulfil with the ‘Purchase Neuquino’.85 
Assessment 
To replicate at least some of the US shale experience in Argentina, the case study demonstrates that 
specific legal instruments have been introduced, especially in the concession arrangements but also 
in terms of the ambitious and highly detailed local content policy, clearly aimed at building up a 
services sector. The location of the main shale plays away from densely populated areas is no doubt 
a factor in their rapid development to date. The ‘social licence to operate’ has not been a major 
concern in these areas. Building on its promising geology, Argentina has made considerable effort in 
its recent law and policy to provide credible legal and economic stability to investors. The plethora of 
instruments and incentives provides an encouraging setting for investment promotion, leading to a 
future reversal of the decline in oil and gas production and a recovery of Argentina’s energy 
independence. 
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4. CASE STUDY 2: COLOMBIA 
Reacting to shale 1.0 
The development of the unconventional hydrocarbons industry in the US, and its success in terms of 
the rapid increase of production that allowed it to become self-sufficient after decades of being a 
net importer, attracted considerable attention in Colombia. 
Evidence of suitable geology and possible reserves was already there. According to the US 
Energy Information Administration, the Colombian territory holds two formations (La Luna and 
Guacheta´) that share features and other similarities with the Eagle Ford shale play in Texas, 86one of 
the most productive formations of unconventional hydrocarbons in the USA.87 
Estimated reserves of Colombia are around 55 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF) of shale gas and 6.8 
billion barrels of shale oil, located in the areas with better potential for the development of shale gas 
and oil resources. To stimulate interest in shale resources, a bid round was held in 201288 in which 
the government offered 12 areas located over plays with new prospectivity, and 18 areas on frontier 
plays where the geological knowledge was very limited. The result was the licensing of five areas of 
the former, but none of the later. In addition, the government included a tax incentive for 
unconventional hydrocarbons, under which the royalty to be paid over the production of 
unconventional resources is only 60 per cent of the rate for conventional oil production.89 This round 
signalled the beginning of government actions to promote unconventional hydrocarbons resources. 
The legal and policy framework 
Under Article 332 of the Constitution, ownership of the subsoil and all non-renewable natural 
resources lies with the State. Under certain conditions, private parties may explore for and produce 
                                                          
86 US Energy Information Administration. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An 
Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside of the US. US Department of Energy. Junes 2013. 
87 US Energy Information Administration. Drilling Productivity Report for key tight oil and gas regions. March 
2015. 
88 NHA. Term of reference for Colombia Round 2012. <http://www.anh.gov.co/Asignacion-de-
areas/Procedimientos-de-
Seleccion/Procesos%20Anteriores/Ronda%20Colombia%202012/Terms%20of%20Reference-
%20Addendum%20No.%204%20English%20translation.pdf> accessed 1 March 2018. 
89 Law 1530 of 2012. art 14. 
hydrocarbons however, subject to grant of rights in the form of a concession and payment of 
royalties. The rules for hydrocarbons activities are set out in national laws, regulations and in the 
terms of concessions granted to applicants from time to time. 
A hydrocarbons policy emerged in the 1990s as a response to instability in the country’s 
energy supply. Due to the El Niño phenomenon, the supply of electricity was adversely affected by a 
drought that left the country with constant blackouts for almost a year.90 This drew attention to the 
fundamental role that energy played in the daily functioning of the country, and as a driver of its 
future development. At the time, Colombia was heavily dependent upon hydroelectric power (in 
1992 it amounted to 78 per cent of the installed capacity), and given the risks associated with such 
supply and climate-related events this put the country in a very risky position.91 Among other 
measures taken by the government to lessen this risk, the diversification of primary energy sources 
led to the investment and development of fossil fuel-powered generation plants. Ironically, while 
Colombia is one of the largest exporters of coal, most of the plants built for this purpose used gas as 
the source of electricity generation.  
This situation provided an impetus to the identification of indigenous supplies of oil and gas, 
which eventually led to important discoveries during the 1990s that in turn allowed a constant 
supply of petroleum. This covered the local demand for gas and increased the resources of the 
government through revenues from oil exports.92 In 2006 the government issued a national energy 
policy document (National Energy Plan 2006–2593), in which it stated the need to continue the 
process of diversification of primary energy sources. This included the need to increase the rate of 
exploration drilling, as well as the potential need to build a regasification terminal on the coast. 
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Energy security was the dominant concern and increasing the supply of hydrocarbons was a key 
element in ensuring energy security. 
These measures have ensured a diversification of the energy matrix. By 2012, 69.9 per cent 
of the electricity in Colombia was generated by hydro-powered sources, 24.8 per cent by gas-
powered sources, and 4.9 per cent by coal-powered sources.94 However, there was still a need to 
develop additional supply sources of hydrocarbons to continue supporting the economy, in case of a 
recurrence of extreme climate patterns such as the deterioration attributable to the El Niño 
phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, the hydrocarbons reserves bear no comparison with those of its neighbour, 
Venezuela. Hydrocarbons have become a part of the Colombian economy but are not central to it. 
Foreign companies have long been present, and several contractual systems have been applied, 
including the service contract as early as 1951, and later an association contract until 2003.95 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the hydrocarbons sector was in decline and needed a 
dramatic restructuring if it was to survive. As of 1999, the estimated reserves of hydrocarbons 
appeared likely to supply the needs of the economy for the next four years, and the number of 
exploratory wells was a mere 10 in the year 2002; despite this, the government take was as high as 
82 per cent.96 Changes implemented by the government included the partial privatization of the 
National Oil Company (NOC) (10 per cent of its shares), the transfer of regulatory capacity to an 
independent regulatory body (the National Hydrocarbons Agency, or NHA), as well as a substantial 
reduction in the government take. By implementing law-decree 1760 of 2003, the government 
separated out the activities of the NOC (also known as Ecopetrol). It focused Ecopetrol’s operations 
on exploration and production, while passing regulatory powers to the NHA. In addition, the 
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contractual system changed from an association contract to a modern concession system. Two 
primary types of concession contract were used: a Technical Evaluation Agreement was created to 
incentivize the investor to carry out exploration activities, and an Exploration and Production 
Contract was created to incentivize the final exploration and a more concrete phase of hydrocarbon 
production.97 
Under this new concession model, the participation of the government or the NOC was 
limited to its regulatory role. They therefore did not participate in any exploration or commercial 
decision-making. In addition, this new model entitled the investor to the full rights of production, 
after the payment of tax and royalties.98 
The results of the implementation of the abovementioned changes had a direct impact on 
the oil and gas sector in Colombia. Exploratory activity increased, and in 2003 alone there were 28 
new A3 wells drilled— five of them with successful results. In addition, seismic exploration also 
increased to 3470 km in the same year.99 
Regulatory stimuli and favourable international prices thus combined to power the 
hydrocarbons sector in Colombia. After 2003, companies from Europe, North America and Asia 
decided to invest in the prospects offered by the government. Due to the increased investments and 
the continuous efforts from the private and public sectors, production of oil in Colombia increased 
from 528 thousand barrels a day in 2004 to 786 thousand a day in 2010. At the peak point of 
production in 2013, over one million barrels per day were produced.100 
The improvement in production also reflected a sustained increase in foreign direct 
investment, as the oil and gas sector jumped from USD 278 million in foreign direct investment in 
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2003 to over USD 5.4 billion in 2012.101 Additionally, the income of royalties received by the 
Colombian government between 2010 and 2014 had an increase of 40 per cent, demonstrating a 
correlation between the progress of the energy sector and the additional sources of funding for the 
government.102 
However, the boom in commodity prices, especially with respect to hydrocarbons, began 
slowing down in 2014. The oil and gas industry in Colombia was faced with the need to restructure 
to maintain the levels of production and exploration. The answer came from the independent 
regulatory body, the NHA, which became more flexible with respect to contractual deadlines, among 
other measures. The NHA also allowed the option of transferring investment commitments from 
certain exploration programmes to others that were on the license, or to other licenses granted to 
the same company.103 
This situation affected the finances of the Colombian government, which decided to carry 
out a tax reform to compensate for the decline in revenues it was receiving from oil and gas 
production.104 Despite the abovementioned measures taken by the Colombian government to 
maintain levels of production, sustain the rate of foreign investment and stabilize the conditions of 
the market, the fall in the price of oil affected the industry negatively and its activity began to 
decline. According to a report from a fiscal agency within the Colombian government, the lack of 
exploration and the low price of hydrocarbons indicated that the country could become a net 
importer of oil as early as 2021.105 
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Ecopetrol (the NOC) has had success in several areas of exploration, but the rate of these 
findings is not sufficiently high to compensate for the replacement of reserves. This replacement of 
reserves is needed for Colombia to regain control over its own security of supply on hydrocarbons. 
As a result, the policy choice of encouraging exploration of unconventional hydrocarbons gained 
traction. A debate began about whether such oil and gas formations should be developed or not. For 
some, shale resources appeared to be one attractive way of tackling the issues outlined above. 
Regulating to promote unconventional hydrocarbons 
The National Council for Social and Economic Policy is the highest authority for policy 
decisions in Colombia. In 2008, it issued a document where it recommended establishing technical 
guidelines for the exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. It also recommended 
the design of legal tools and a model contract that could be utilized when taking decisions based on 
the technical guidelines.106 This document was the first public document that the Colombian 
Government issued regarding shale resources, and it was the first official sign of an intention to 
develop them. 
In 2012, the Ministry of Mines and Energy issued a resolution where it established the 
procedures for the exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. The resolution 
referred to the first technical requirements for exploration, such as seismic information, the 
decommissioning of exploratory wells, and requirements to commence a production well. 
Additionally, the resolution includes a procedure to be utilized if two lawful license-holders, who 
have the right to explore and exploit the natural resources underground, have interests in the same 
areas and face a conflict on who can exploit the resource. According to the Colombian government, 
it is required that the parties begin a negotiation and each present action plans to solve the conflict, 
as well as provide a technical basis for a better exploitation of the underground resources. If no 
agreement is reached by the parties, the Ministry of Mines and Energy will appoint an expert (from a 
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group of experts nominated by the parties) who will decide from a technical perspective which party 
has the best possibility of optimizing the exploitation of the resources.107 This unique situation 
provides a way to solve, for example, a conflict between a titleholder for a coalmine that is in the 
production phase, and a potential license holder that may be interested in exploiting Coalbed 
Methane reserves that are in the same area. 
In 2014, several technical and contractual developments occurred that improved the 
prospects of the unconventional hydrocarbons industry in Colombia. The NHA produced a model 
Exploration and Production contract that included modifications reflecting the particularities of 
unconventional hydrocarbon resources. For example, the exploration period was extended from 6 to 
9 years, the period for the programme of evaluation was extended from 2 to 4 years, and the 
production period was extended from 24 to 30 years. Regarding the relinquishment of land, it 
allowed the licensee the right to maintain 50 per cent of the areas that have been assigned under 
the license if they present a new exploratory programme.108 
The contractual process was also modified, and the financial and technical requirements for 
the development of unconventional hydrocarbons were raised according to the type of activity and 
the area that would be explored. In general, all requirements were stricter for the concessionaire 
than those applicable to a conventional hydrocarbons project.109 
In the same year, the Ministry of Mines and Energy issued special regulations for the 
exploration and production of unconventional hydrocarbons. This new directive was very detailed 
with respect to the procedures and technical specifications for the construction of wells, particularly 
in the areas where underground water sources may be located.110 
The regulations covered the areas illustrated in Table 2: 
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The abovementioned regulations refer to key issues that have been at the heart of the 
technical controversy over shale gas in the USA and can be seen as providing a basis to respond 
positively to environmental concerns about the production of shale resources. 
In the same year—2014—the Ministry of Environment issued the terms of reference for the 
environmental impact assessment for unconventional hydrocarbons,111 with very specific 
requirements addressing the new situations and potential risks that the new techniques could bring. 
Amongst them were: 
• The need to include studies about the underground water sources, its geological features, 
direction of the flow of water, connection with other aquifers, and condition for human 
consumption of the liquid. 
• The need to inform the authorities about the location of aquifers, permeability of the 
stratigraphic formations, including any faults or fractures that are present. 
• It is required to prepare a baseline study on quality of air, including the monitoring and 
presence of carbon monoxide, methane, among others. 
• The need to disclose the products that will be used on the fracturing liquid, including the 
name of the chemical product as it is known in the market, and its purpose on the fluid in 
the chemical substance is under any recognized trade secret, the chemical general family 
must be included. 
Challenges and locally crafted solutions 
Foreign influence in the regulatory developments in Colombia 
By 2012 the authorities had decided to consider the potential risks and benefits of developing 
unconventional hydrocarbons in Colombia in greater detail, considering experiences from other 
countries with more technical knowledge, as well as international bodies such as the Commission of 
the European Union. On an informed basis, it then proposed to take a decision to support this 
innovative technology and its use in Colombia or not. 
The study was divided into four phases: (i) consultation and advice from renowned 
international experts; (ii) field visits from the highest authorities to the blocks and areas where shale 
gas had been developing; (iii) meetings with regulators and technical authorities of the countries and 
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states that have allowed the technology to be used in their areas, and next, (iv) a final decision 
would be taken. 
The first phase included the invitation of experts that had been advising the American 
government on fracking and its development. These experts advised the personnel of the four 
institutions that would potentially be involved in the regulation of any activity related to fracking.112 
Fourteen different experts, with both positive and negative views on the use of fracking, were 
invited to share their knowledge and opinions with the staff of the authorities. This process was 
designed to allow the decision-makers, their support staff, and particularly the people that would 
have to deal with the events on a day-to-day basis, to have a better understanding of the 
technology, the risks and the benefits that fracking could bring. 
The second phase included the visit of officers from the Ministry of Mines and Energy and 
the Ministry of Environment to British Columbia and to Texas, principally to the zone where the 
Eagle Ford formation is located. This allowed them to see and experience at first hand the 
development and activity that was carried on there, and to evaluate the reality of a production area. 
The visits also coincided with several meetings with regulatory bodies from Colorado, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Alberta and British Columbia. These meetings helped the officers to understand from 
a technical point of view,113 drawing upon the experience of those states and provinces, how the 
industry had developed, how the regulations were able to reduce risks, and how the operations had 
been carried out in those areas.114 
The result was that these efforts produced the technical regulations for the exploration and 
production of unconventional hydrocarbons, the terms of reference for the environmental impact 
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assessments required for the environmental licenses, and the modification of the standard 
concession contract that allows for exploration and production of oil and gas in the country. 
The comparative aspect of the study, drawing upon experiences and advice from regulators 
and policy experts from countries and areas where the boom has occurred, were essential in 
developing the regulatory framework in Colombia. Extrapolating from the experiences of the US, the 
need for baseline studies on the geology of the area, the location of aquifers and the potential for 
tremors and seismic activity became clear. This information is now required by the Colombian 
authorities—an example of how the regulatory processes from other jurisdictions has influenced the 
substantive regulatory process in Colombia. 
Another example of how North American experiences have shaped the regulatory process in 
Colombia is the increase in financial and technical requirements for companies that are interested in 
developing unconventional resources. Experience in the US and Canada has shown the need for 
profound technical knowledge, skill and capacity to manage the complex requirements of fracking 
and horizontal drilling. It is also necessary to have substantial financial capacity to fund such a 
capital- and time-intensive operation, and especially to be able to demonstrate this capacity in the 
event of unforeseen issues. Therefore, the increases in requirements show how the Colombian 
authorities have learnt from foreign experiences and used this knowledge in crafting their own 
regulations. 
Overlapping claims 
Concern about overlapping locations of interest between conventional and unconventional 
hydrocarbons licensees seems to be a constant feature of the Colombian framework.115 The current 
regulations provide different options for companies that may find themselves in this position. 
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On the one hand, the abovementioned procedure for the solution of disputes between 
licensees with a conflict regarding who may develop a specific hydrocarbon or mineral resource and 
how to develop it appears to be a new stage in the regulation of shale resources. However, the 
regulation also allows another option, where the holder of an unconventional licence is encouraged 
to create a team or consortium with a licensee that already has conventional resources under 
development. With this approach, a new company could develop the area for the conventional 
resources in place as well as for unconventional resources that may also be there. This approach 
clearly makes effective use of the infrastructure currently in place, which may have already been 
developed with the local community and have the technical features and information already 
obtained by the previous licensee on the ground. 
While conflicting interests in areas of exploration are evidently a persistent feature of 
hydrocarbons activity in Colombia, the regulators have been able to create pathways to develop 
both conventional and unconventional resources—both of which are useful to improve the security 
of supply for the country.  
Assessment 
The hydrocarbons industry plays a key role in the economy of Colombia, due to the large foreign 
investment it attracts and the income it generates for the government of a developing country. 
However, as this country study demonstrates, extensive measures have been taken to adapt it to 
changed circumstances, notably in 2003 and again to introduce a regime for unconventional 
hydrocarbons development. The latter contains several features of note: a distinct regulatory 
regime, and wide-ranging public consultations on its design; steps to ensure that conventional and 
unconventional activity is harmonized from a regulatory point of view. An interesting gap is that 
local content requirements appear to be absent from the Colombian regime for shale gas resources, 
and no distinct local content policy is evident. 
If one looks beyond the hydrocarbons sector, there are three macroeconomic or social 
factors that are likely to influence the future development of shale resources. Firstly, while Colombia 
has made substantial progress in the peaceful solution of its internal armed conflict by signing a 
peace agreement with a body known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (in Spanish the 
acronym is FARC), other guerrilla groups continue to engage in terrorist activity and target the 
vulnerable hydrocarbons transport infrastructure. Secondly, local communities have begun to 
mobilize themselves to oppose projects involving the extractive industries (particularly mining 
projects), using electoral tools that may allow them to legally prohibit extracting activities on their 
land, adding doubt to investors seeking a social license to operate on Colombian territory. Finally, 
the economic and financial viability of petroleum production is challenged due to high lifting and 
transportation costs. 
However, the possibility that Colombia may in the foreseeable future have to commence 
imports of hydrocarbons from its neighbours or from other countries is an option that many 
policymakers and private sector leaders see as ‘of last resort’. Therefore, there seems to be a 
consensus emerging for the need to make a renewed effort at developing unconventional 
hydrocarbons. The need to increase the reserves, and to replace the income for the central 
government, seems to be driving informed opinion towards the development of shale resources. 
Nevertheless, there is strong opposition from a different (and still informed) constellation of 
environmental groups, local communities and academics. This is likely to require a new policy 
initiative from government to move forward. 
5. CASE STUDY 3: UK 
Reacting to shale 1.0 
The emergence of an unconventional hydrocarbon industry was kick-started in the UK by the 
interest of policy-makers in the rapid development of unconventional resources across the Atlantic 
and the evident economic benefits this brought to the US economy. For some in the UK, this seemed 
to be a ‘game-changer’, occurring fortuitously at a time when the UK’s revenues from North Sea oil 
and gas were in decline and import dependency was on the rise. In 2016, only 43 per cent of UK gas 
requirements were met from UK production and 57 per cent were imported from outside the UK—
44 per cent from European pipelines and 13 per cent from LNG tankers. In other words, the UK 
imports more gas than it produces, and by the start of 2017 gas production was no more than a third 
of the peak level recorded in 2000.116 
The speed with which Shale 1.0 appeared to transform the US energy economy acted as a 
stimulus to UK policy development with the goal of replicating the US success even if on a smaller 
scale. In this Case Study we examine how the existing regulatory regime for conventional 
hydrocarbons was initially modified, and then supplemented by a series of specific legal measures 
aimed at promoting unconventional resource exploration and development. 
An initial lack of knowledge of the geological potential was boosted by several studies, most 
notably by the UK Government and the British Geological Society (BGS).117 Shale beds are not found 
all over the UK. In England the most promising areas were quickly identified in several studies: the 
Bowland-Hodder study of June 2013; the Weald Basin study of May 2014 and in Scotland, the 
Midland Valley of Scotland study of June 2014.118 These reports and the wider DECC-BGS report 
supported the view that shale gas reserves ‘could be’ significant. However, one report noted: ‘The 
untested shale rock volume in the UK is very large; however, more drilling, fracture stimulating, and 
production testing is necessary to prove that shale gas development is technically and economically 
viable. Even if one assumes that the American shale gas producing analogies are valid, many of the 
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operating conditions are different in the UK’.119 There was therefore some uncertainty about the 
results. Uncertainty about technically recoverable reserves of shale gas and oil was further 
supported by a 2012 report from the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC).120 Despite this, the UK 
Government has repeatedly affirmed in policy statements that shale gas could materially contribute 
to the UK’s energy security and offer economic benefits, a position unsurprisingly supported by 
companies heavily involved in the UK shale gas sector. Its estimates have been criticised as over-
optimistic by the BGS.121 
The legal and policy framework 
The framework for energy policy in the UK is more complex than in many countries, with shared 
competencies distributed across international, national and sub-national tiers of government.122 As a 
Member State of the EU (and for some years following its withdrawal), the UK must comply with EU 
law, including its legislation on energy, health and safety and environment. In these areas however, 
competences are often shared or left to the national rather than the EU level.123 Within the UK, a 
devolved governance structure operates so that certain legislative powers reside in separate 
devolved governing bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Under this arrangement, 
legislative powers are separated into ‘reserved’ matters remaining under the full jurisdiction of the 
UK and devolved matters that are placed within the jurisdiction of the devolved areas. 
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safeguarding principles that Member States should implement to regulate shale gas operations. This is not 
legally binding. It sets out as minimum requirements the following: a requirement for operators to carry out a 
risk assessment and a baseline environmental study before they start operations; a requirement that 
operators provide a financial guarantee or equivalent that covers their obligations under permits and potential 
liabilities for environmental damage; and a requirement for a survey to be made after each installation’s 
closure to compare the environmental condition of the site with its pre-operational state as set out in the 
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In energy terms, the effect of devolution is that the UK authorities have reserved powers 
over the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity; the ownership, exploration 
and exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits; coal (including its ownership and exploitation) and nuclear 
energy and nuclear installations. Devolved matters include powers over related areas such the 
environment, planning and some economic development, including fiscal powers. It is worth noting 
that dividing responsibilities between the UK and devolved governments in this way has not led to a 
clear separation of powers in practice.124 
At the national level, it is the UK as the sovereign state that holds key responsibilities for 
meeting international (e.g. the Paris Agreement) and EU (e.g. the 2009 Renewable and Climate 
Change Directive) commitments. As such, it is the UK Government, primarily through the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)125 and the UK Treasury, that designs 
the wider electricity market and the main policy instruments to promote several types of energy 
(e.g. renewables, nuclear, shale gas). They also hold oversight responsibility for regulating both the 
energy sector and energy networks via the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), a pan-UK 
independent energy regulatory body alongside other bodies including the Crown Estate and National 
Grid. It is also the UK Government that participates directly in negotiations at the international level 
on the direction of current and future energy relevant policy.126 Other agencies play a role in 
unconventional resource development. Two require mention. The Environment Agency is the 
environmental regulator for all onshore oil and gas operations in England, including: Shale gas; Coal 
bed methane; and Underground coal gasification. Following devolution in 1997, there have been 
several changes to the institutional and regulatory landscape in the devolved administrations. Since 
the Offshore Safety Act 1992, health and safety has not been a factor BEIS checks when considering 
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the competence of an operator. This is wholly the responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE), an independent regulator, responsible for enforcing health and safety legislation in 
workplaces. 
The above complex structure has given rise to concerns that there is a ‘regulatory maze’ 
which could act as a deterrent to new investors. For that reason, the UK Government has issued 
guidance notes for investors about how to address matters such as applications for planning 
consents. 
Regulating to promote unconventional hydrocarbons 
Adaptation of the existing licensing regime 
In regulatory terms, unconventional energy has been developed to date as a sub-set of the 
established regime for conventional hydrocarbons. Although a pragmatic choice, this implicitly set to 
one side the distinct features of unconventional resource development. The starting point is that in 
the UK, as in most countries, ownership of underground hydrocarbons is vested in the State, or in 
this case the Crown. Responsibility for managing the sector lies with the Secretary of State for 
Energy, whose department—the BIES127—is responsible for setting energy policy and establishing 
the framework for achieving policy goals. BEIS is responsible for petroleum licensing of onshore and 
offshore activities, including decommissioning of oil and gas installations and pipelines, as well as 
enforcing environmental legislation. The department has set up the Office for Unconventional Gas 
and Oil (OUGO) to ‘promote the UK’s unconventional reserves of gas and oil’, including shale gas and 
oil. 
The conventional sector has been regulated by means of licences, usually awarded following 
rounds of bidding that since 1994 must be publicly advertised in the Official Journal of the European 
Union.128 The onshore licensing system distinguishes between the exploration and production stages 
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with different licences,129 with production licences divided according to the specific features of the 
area and the company that is applying for them.130 The licence conditions are published in statutory 
instruments under the Petroleum Act 1998 and are known as model clauses. They are quite detailed 
in character. 
The key licence for a company seeking to carry out onshore hydrocarbons exploration and 
development is the Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence (PEDL). This grants the holder 
the exclusive right to pursue a range of oil and gas exploration activities, subject to necessary 
drilling/development consents and planning permission. Each PEDL confers such rights over a limited 
area and for defined phases. Exploration can last for three years (from 2014) while up to six years 
was previously the norm for onshore hydrocarbons exploration. Appraisal can last for five years and 
requires the holder to draw up and submit a field development plan. The production phase for oil 
and natural gas is 20 years with a possible extension. Unless the licensee has made sufficient 
progress as the end of each phase to move to the next phase, it will expire. At the end of the 
exploration phase, no less than 50 per cent of the acreage must be given up. For shale gas reserves 
however, which are likely to be spread over a much wider area than conventional gas reserves, such  
a relinquishment obligation would be a disincentive. This was modified in 2014, so that this 
obligation is subject to a new power for the Minister to agree with the licensee on the establishment 
of Retention Areas and Development Areas: if the licensee company seeks to make a part of its 
Licensed Area into a Retention Area, it must submit a Retention Area Plan describing the exploration 
and appraisal activities that the licensee intends to carry out in the Retention Area. The Minister can 
approve this application and the licensee retains the area sought into the second term. The same 
can happen with a Development Area. It is also possible for the licensed area that is surrendered or 
retained to be identified in three rather than two dimensions. 
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When this onshore licensing regime was expanded to include shale gas and oil, there were—
initially at leas—only a few differences between them. The predecessor of BEIS advised in 2013 that 
there is no firm licensing distinction between exploration for shale gas and exploration for 
conventional oil and gas. Some companies which are drilling mainly for conventional oil and gas have 
decided to drill deeper than they otherwise might have, to see whether there is prospective shale in 
their licensed areas. 
Before fracking can take place, however, certain permitting requirements beyond those in 
the PEDL need to be complied with. A 2013 ‘regulatory roadmap’ noted the following ‘four’ consents 
as required before a licensee could commence full exploration activity: environmental consents; 
departmental consent to drill a well and undertake fracturing; planning permission; and land access 
consents from landowners. In the UK the focus is on requirements for consents that are necessary 
for shale gas (rather than oil) exploration and not production since none is yet taking place. Where 
the licensee seeks to progress from exploration to production, it will need to go through a second 
round of regulatory consents. Given the lack of experience of this phase by regulators, it can be 
assumed that this part of the process is still evolving. 
Some brief comments on each of these four consent processes seems necessary to fill in an 
important regulatory space. The first set of consents required by shale gas operators includes mining 
waste permits; a water abstraction licence; groundwater activity permits; radioactive substances 
activity permits; and assessment and approval of chemicals used for hydraulic fracturing. An 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) may also be required. 
The second set of consents relates to drilling and is obtained from the government 
department. They are influenced by an incident in northern England in 2011, where earth tremors 
were alleged to have been triggered by the UK’s first shale production test. Now, shale gas operators 
are required to: assess the seismic hazards presented by hydraulic fracturing activity in each well site 
area; monitor the seismic activity of the well site area and develop and implement a mitigation plan 
for possible earthquakes caused by hydraulic fracturing. A real-time trigger has also to be installed 
that will act to cut off injection into a well if there is a significant risk of an earthquake. 
A third set of consents concerns planning permission. In England and Wales this is managed 
by the Minerals Planning Authorities (MPAs), which have responsibility for planning control of works 
carried out in connection with mineral development. The MPAs are required to carry out 
consultations and decide on an application within 13 weeks. The considerations they have to take 
into account relevant to unconventional resource development include: air quality, traffic, risk of 
contamination to land, wildlife; and land stability. 
Finally, there are consents from the relevant landowners. In contrast to large parts of the 
US, landowners in the UK do not own the resources in the ground and so they are not entitled to sell 
shale gas or oil reserves located under their land. However, they are entitled to compensation 
through land access agreements paid by a shale operator (for rights of access and the location of the 
drilling pad itself). A company seeking access is also required to have permission from all landowners 
under whose land they drill. This has been modified however, as is discussed below in the Section 
‘Challenges and locally crafted solutions’. 
The UK has, alongside Norway, one of the most stringent onshore drilling safety regimes in 
the world. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) monitors shale gas operations from a well integrity 
and site safety perspective. They are charged with ensuring that safe working practices are adopted 
by onshore operators as required under the Health and Safety at Work Etc., Act 1974. Regulations 
made under the Act include: 
• The Borehole Site and Operations Regulations 1995 (BSOR) applies to shale gas operations. 
(These regulations are primarily concerned with the health and safety management of the 
site). 
• The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations 1996 
(DCR) apply to all wells drilled with a view to the extraction of petroleum regardless of 
whether they are onshore or offshore. 
The above regime was first used for unconventional energy in 2008 with the grant of a 
promote (exploration) license to Cuadrilla Resources and Lucas Energy. The license included a 
working programme of 400 km of 2D seismic data in the first part of the initial term and a drill or 
drop commitment for well of 1000 metres in depth. 
Specific initiatives and innovations 
The UK Government has been proactive in its express policy support for a shale gas sector. Initially, 
in its own version of Shale 1.0, it simply adapted the existing regime for conventional hydrocarbons 
development to the harnessing of unconventional resources. At the same time, it faced public 
concerns about safety and environmental issues which led briefly to the imposition of a moratorium 
on development while ongoing research was completed into a number of issues. The context of 
public concern and uncertainty about resource potential had the effect of preventing the emergence 
of a new industry in unconventional resources. The regulatory regime was one of the variables which 
government was able to affect if it chose to do so. Several initiatives were subsequently taken, with 
three notable changes to the regulatory regime: planning rules; faster processing of shale gas licence 
applications; and improved rules for infrastructure provision. 
Planning permission. In England and Wales, proposals for shale gas exploration or extraction are 
subject to the requirements of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 administered by the MPAs 
for the area in which the development is located. Consents and other permissions are only provided 
by BEIS once planning permission has been obtained by the MPA. 
Planning decision-making is based in accordance with the policies set out in the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and the ‘minerals’ section of the online Planning Practice 
Guidance (PPG). Furthermore, when a decision is made on a planning application, only planning 
matters called ‘material considerations’ can be taken into account. There is no exhaustive list of 
what constitutes a material planning consideration, although the PPG lists some ‘principal issues’ for 
consideration. These can include: noise associated with the operation; dust; air quality; lighting; 
visual impact; landscape character; traffic; risk of contamination; land stability/subsidence; 
ecological/biodiversity importance; surface and ground water issues and water abstraction. 
The UK Government has been consulting on changes to the NPPF to provide very implicit 
support for shale gas from MPAs. Currently, the NPPF says: 
When determining planning applications, local planning authorities should give great weight 
to be benefits of mineral extraction, including to the economy’. 
The Government wants to change this to ‘Minerals planning authorities should: ‘recognise 
the benefits of on-shore oil and gas development, including unconventional hydrocarbons, 
for the security of energy supplies and supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy; 
and put in place policies to facilitate their exploration and extraction’.131 
Faster decisions on shale gas planning applications. Other changes to speed up planning decision-
making have included removing the need in 2014 to notify individual owners of land and tenants on 
ground where only underground operations may take place (ie not the actual above ground 
development).132 In 2015, the UK Government announced a number of additional measures aimed 
at the shale gas sector.133 The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government will make 
the final decision on planning appeals related to exploring and developing shale gas, thus removing 
the role of the planning inspector. This change is limited to a two-year period, although it might be 
extended. 
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The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government also has powers to ‘call-in’ 
shale gas applications before they are decided by the local planning authority and identifying 
underperforming local planning authorities. The statutory deadline for determining a planning 
application where an application is subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is 16 
weeks. The UK Government would identify underperforming local planning authorities that 
‘repeatedly fail’ to determine oil and gas applications within statutory timeframes. When such 
applications are made to underperforming local planning authorities, the Secretary of State will be 
able to consider whether to determine the application instead of the local planning authority. 
Opposition to fracking has usually been expressed through delays and problems on the 
licenses granted by local councils in the use of land. The Government decided to increase the 
competence of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, by giving the said 
Secretary of State the capacity to act as final decision-maker on appeals for licenses related to shale 
gas developments. In addition, the same public officer has the power call in shale gas applications 
before they are decided and to identify underperforming local planning authorities. This increase 
and centralization of power in Westminster (at the UK Government level) over local decisions is an 
approach that demonstrates the importance of shale gas developments for a national energy 
strategy. However, it also opens up shale gas to policy or political risk, for example in the event that 
a government is elected that opposes shale gas development in the UK or the devolved nations: this 
has already occurred in Scotland which has banned shale gas exploitation (see also Section 
‘Challenges and locally crafted solutions’). 
At a site in England where licences have been granted to Cuadrilla Resources, work had not 
yet started after six years.134 
This provided the context and impetus to a new package of measures in May 2018. The main 
elements of this were: a streamlining of the regulation process for applications to ensure decisions 
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are made in a timely manner. This includes establishment of a Shale Environmental Regulator and a 
Planning Brokerage Service. Noting that the Oil and Gas Authority also has a role in regulation, the 
initiative tries to bring the regulators together to act as a single coherent face for the public, mineral 
planning authorities and industry. It will operate in England only. In addition, there is a shale support 
fund to build capacity in local authorities when dealing with shale applications. Earlier, in the 
autumn of 2017, a Shale Wealth Fund had been established to provide additional resources to local 
communities, to supplement funds offered by industry to local communities. 
The Infrastructure Act 2015. This is a major piece of legislation that aims to streamline the 
underground access regime to make it easier for companies to drill for shale gas.135 Under the 
previous system, licence holders did not have automatic access rights to drill under landowners’ 
property and had to seek permission before they could do so. If permission was refused, then licence 
holders could apply through the Secretary of State and courts to gain access, but the Government 
considered this route to be too time consuming. This effectively removes trespass rights for 
landowners for underground access below 300 metres. The Act did make provision for landowner 
compensation from the development but left the onus on proving any damage or disruption on the 
landowner, which carries additional expenses and risks. The Infrastructure Act 2015 also extended 
the Community benefits approach developed for the onshore wind sector to shale gas. Under this 
approach, the industry agreed to pay £100,000 to communities per hydraulically fractured well site 
at the exploratory stage, and 1 per cent of revenue if it successfully goes into production. In 
addition, the industry confirmed that operators would contribute a voluntary one-off payment of 
£20,000 for the right to use deep-level land for each unique lateral well that extends by more than 
200 metres and would notify the public when exercising this power. 
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Environmental considerations. The potential effects that shale gas development may have on the 
environment are a paramount concern for a portion of the society in the UK, which has expressed it 
through public demonstrations, such as the one that occurred in Lancashire in 2013, and elsewhere 
around the UK where shale gas activities are planned or taking place.136 
One of these concerns refers to the potential contamination of water through a leak on the 
integrity of the well. This issue was raised by the UK House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee inquiry in 2011,137 and the government reiterated in their response to the inquiry 
findings that the regulatory agencies in charge of energy and petroleum have dealt with lateral 
drilling and fracturing before, thus meaning that they have existing current technical capability to 
regulate this new industry. Referring to the integrity of the well, a scheme to prevent contamination 
in offshore well was has also been applied before, and it is also applicable for this purpose.138 In 
addition, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering considered that because fracking 
occurs at a considerable distance from aquifers, it is not very likely that they may be affected by the 
fracturing operation.139 
Fracking has a very intensive use of water, which has been highlighted as another cause for 
concern. According to the UK Government in 2016, the use of water would depend on the 
requirements of each site, and the heavy regulatory process for the use of water, would provide 
enough opportunities to evaluate the sustainable use of water, allowing the relevant regulators to 
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make decisions on the licenses for the use of water, without endangering the supply of such an 
important liquid.140 
The disposal of the water used or produced during the fracking process has also been a 
controversial issue in several jurisdictions, including the UK. Current EU and UK regulation do not 
allow the re-injection of the water into the well, and therefore it needs to be processed and 
disposed elsewhere.141 
In April 2011, some seismic events occurred near an area where fracking operations were 
carried out and the company involved stated that they would postpone operations. The response 
from the UK Government was to impose a moratorium that lasted for 10 months.142 The BGS as well 
as the Environmental Agency carried out studies and in December 2012, fracking activities resumed. 
Today the regulation includes additional requirements such as: 
• Conduct a prior examination of existing faults and seismic risks. 
• Submit a report to BEIS on how seismic risk would be addressed. 
• Implement seismic monitoring before and during the fracturing job, including the use of the ‘traffic 
light’ system to establish to continue, reassess or stop the fracking activity.143 
An example of the influence of the American experience is that of the need to share any 
resultant financial benefits from shale gas developments with the communities that must bear the 
effects associated with shale gas exploration and production. Even though the principles and 
systems of ownership of resources underground is very different between the UK and the US, the 
idea to provide additional benefits to land owners and residents of the area where the fracking 
activity takes place appears like the individual compensation that occurs in the US, primarily due to 
the private ownership of underground resources. Therefore, the possibility that the companies 
agree to pay £100,000 to communities per hydraulically fractured well site at the exploratory stage, 
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and 1 per cent of revenue if it successfully goes into production, creates a new model of private 
compensation for the residents instead of providing general compensation to society only through 
taxes and royalties. 
The government has issued for public consultation a proposal to create an allowance for 
shale gas exploration and production that would reduce the tax portion on the income from a 
company from 62 per cent to 30 per cent.144 
Experience of other jurisdictions, such as the US, on how to face the potential risks, becomes 
useful for the new developments in the UK. An example of this is the fact that the re-injection of 
water cannot be carried out in the UK, following the lead of North Carolina,145 and looking to avoid 
the potential effects on seismic activity that such practice may have. 
What is clear is that the UK Government approach to supporting a domestic UK shale gas 
sector is focused heavily on their view of unconventional fossil fuels as a “potential economic 
prize”.146 This largely ignores domestic and international legally-binding climate change and other 
environmental obligations. Further, it highlights the role of ideology in UK energy (and 
environmental) policy making, with shale gas appearing as a favoured energy technology (along with 
nuclear power and conventional gas) in stark contrast to renewables.147 
Challenges and locally crafted solutions 
The initial approach of adapting the current licensing system for conventional resources for a new 
use and maintaining the jurisdiction of already existent government bodies on the design of policy 
and regulation of the subject have both proved insufficient. Various new initiatives have been 
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required, from OUGO to the Shale Environmental Regulator and a possible Shale Wealth Fund, to 
demonstrate the commitment of the UK Government in developing this resource and have become 
key elements of UK energy policy-making. 
Regulatory divergence inside the UK is a factor that impacts on the prospects for 
unconventional development. The Scotland Act 2016 devolved shale gas licensing to the Scottish 
Parliament, and the Wales Act 2017 includes provisions to devolve shale gas licensing to the National 
Assembly for Wales. To date, the devolved administrations had adopted a negative approach to 
unconventional resource development. In 2015, the Scottish Government announced a moratorium 
on fracking in Scotland which was extended to an outright ban in 2017. In 2015, the Welsh 
Government issued a Direction preventing local planning authorities from approving developments 
which included fracking,148 while in the same year the Northern Ireland Assembly included a 
‘presumption against’ fracking in planning policy guidance.149 Subsequent to the decisions against 
unconventional hydrocarbons in the devolved nations, the main UK opposition party (The Labour 
Party) announced that it would ban fracking when next in government.150 
Foreign Influence 
Previous experience has shown that the US shale gas revolution was led by US-based ‘wildcat’ 
independents151 whilst in Argentina foreign-owned, typically multi-national companies have driven 
development (see Colombia Case Study above). An examination of the ownership of companies 
involved in the development of the UK shale gas sector reveals a slightly different story, with 
indications that all is not well in the UK. 
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Currently, there exists a diverse mix of large and small UK and foreign-based or owned 
companies involved in the fledgling UK shale gas sector. By far the biggest player is Ineos, a privately-
owned multinational chemicals company headquartered in the UK. Two other key shale gas 
specialist companies include Cuadrilla Resources Ltd., a privately-owned company headquartered in 
the UK and IGas, an independent oil and gas exploration and production company, also based in 
London (which also owns Dart Energy, a subsidiary of IGas). Other key companies include the French 
energy giants Total and GDF Suez (Engie); UK-based Centrica the owner of British Gas, one of the ‘Big 
Six’ UK energy companies); Canadian-owned Cirque Energy; Third Energy and less well-known 
companies including Egdon Resources (London-based), Hutton Energy (UK-based), Aurora Energy 
Resources (UK-owned), Osprey Petroleum (UK-owned) and Aberdeen Drilling Management 
(ADM).152 Of interest, a number of these companies are or until recently were in partnership with 
each other to develop a number of sites (e.g. Ineos and Engie, Ineos and Egdon and IGas).153 
This reflects a position somewhere between the US and Argentinian experiences. In part, it 
reflects the prolonged infancy stage of the UK shale gas sector, enabling independent and smaller 
companies to gain entrance (also partly brought on by the other reasons outlined elsewhere in 
Section 5). However, the presence of large-scale multinationals at such an early stage also appears 
to reflect an acceleration of the US experience. At the same time, the acquisition of GDF Suez’s Engie 
shale gas portfolio (15 licences) by Ineos appears to indicate a shift in ownership and appetite 
brought on by a scepticism of UK shale prospects and increasingly attractive markets elsewhere (e.g. 
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renewables, power). Indeed, the selling of its UK shale gas portfolio is part of a wider withdrawal 
from oil and gas.154 
At this early stage, it is difficult to tell what this means. What is clear is that the removal of 
UK hurdles to shale gas exploitation and commercialisation are needed before the majors move in 
strength into the UK domestic market. 
Assessment 
The UK has taken an approach based on the robustness of its already existing regulatory framework, 
and its applicability to unconventional hydrocarbons. The assumption seems to have been that 
decades of experience with conventional resource regulation—primarily offshore—make this 
existing set of legal instruments suitable, particularly when backed by the proven technical capacity 
of the personnel in charge of enforcing it. However, the technical reality of unconventional 
hydrocarbons is very different than those facing offshore exploration and production activities, and 
additional risks have needed to be addressed, requiring the modifications summarized in this 
section. This is a lesson that surely should have been learnt from the early deployment of renewable 
energy technologies, which suffered similar problems in government attempts to deploy them using 
existing regulatory structures.155 
The creation of an agency to promote unconventional hydrocarbons (OUGO), modifications 
to the powers of the central government in local issues, and changes in regulations for underground 
drilling, appear to demonstrate this need to adapt. 
The evolving character of the UK’s constitutional framework has created obstacles for the 
scope of unconventional resource development in the UK. The total ban in Scotland and the strong 
position against fracking in Northern Ireland and Wales contrast strongly with the approach taken by 
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the central government and limit or prohibit the growth of unconventional resource operations in 
these parts of the UK. Even in England, the need to adapt the established regime to allow greater 
engagement by local communities and authorities indicates that challenges remain, which are 
analogous to those facing most infrastructure projects. 
Overall, despite policy and regulatory interventions to support the growth of an 
unconventional resource industry in much of the UK, shale gas and oil drilling remain after several 
years at an exploratory stage and industry’s efforts to improve their knowledge of the true level of 
commercial reserves is modest. No commercial operations have yet commenced. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Table 3 provides a summary of the main features of Shale 1.0 in the first column and lists the 
responses of the three countries in the next three columns. There are significant differences in 
response, with the UK probably emerging as the one most likely to follow the US in the development 
of shale resources, despite territorial restrictions and ongoing issues with respect to the social 
licence to operate. 
Ownership. A defining feature of the economic success of Shale 1.0 was the ownership 
arrangements characterizing hydrocarbons development in certain parts of the USA. The land owner 
owned the hydrocarbons and had a commercial incentive to participate in shale gas development. 
Replicating that financial incentive to landowners in a regime with state ownership of the resources 
is, as the UK example demonstrates, a challenge. This is not a matter of lacking a social licence to 
operate but rather finding a substitute for an important commercial incentive. The ability of 
companies to secure rights from private owners of land quickly was one of the key variables for that 
early success which cannot be replicated outside of the USA, where public ownership of 
hydrocarbons is the norm. 
However, the case studies suggest that this observation may be less fundamental than it 
appears. In each case, the national authority has sufficient legal powers to create arrangements that 
can offer private investors similar and sufficient legal security to be able to support unconventional 
resource activity. However, as in many parts of the USA and Canada, local (or Provincial or State) 
authorities have legal competences in areas that would allow them to delay or hold up projected 
developments in densely populated areas. In Colombia, local community preferences (rather than 
those of private landowners) will play a decisive role in the future of unconventional resource 
development. 
Infrastructure. Availability of local infrastructure is a key consideration which in many cases 
involves its construction. Argentina has made extensive efforts to encourage this. However, the 
effects of its elaborate local content policy in this and other respects are still unclear. As a way of 
improving the benefits to the national economy of shale development this policy emphasis emulates 
the approach taken in many countries with respect to conventional hydrocarbons development, and 
is likely to become a feature of many government policies. 
Environment. The environmental aspect is also less straightforward than it may seem. In 
principle, there is no reason why environmental laws cannot be adjusted to address the challenges 
of new technologies such as fracking. If this is one of the reasons behind the lack of a social licence 
to operate, it seems capable of being addressed and over time improved upon. 
Regulation. Regulatory authority responsible for oversight and monitoring can be designed 
to ensure that it avoids conflicts of interest and where more than one body exists, that cooperation 
among agencies is achievable. UK experience suggests that a single government body for managing 
environmental issues connected with proposed shale development may be required if promotion of 
investment is a policy goal. A key area is the relationship between conventional and unconventional 
activity on the same area. This can be positive and negative, and ought to be anticipated in the 
design of regulations to maximize potential gains for the host state and minimize uncertainties for 
the investor. 
Macroeconomic and social considerations. In each case there was an impact of wider, non-
energy considerations on the policy choices. In Argentina’s case, the shale sector is influenced by the 
country’s wider economic problems in its recent history and efforts to move beyond them; in 
Colombia the recent civil conflict leaves a legacy that threatens infrastructure in this area; and in the 
UK the rapid decline in revenues from North Sea oil and gas have returned the economy to energy 
dependence on external sources after a period of several decades, leading to a search for new 
choices in the energy mix. 
Outcomes for further consideration. There has been little in this study to suggest that the 
diversity in state structures, from federal to provincial to local, creates a major fact of difference 
between them. Similarly, the mix of civil and common law regimes has not yielded any points of 
difference in the various country studies. These differences may exist but are not evident in this 
study. It may also be the case that further examination of tax and fiscal arrangements could be 
carried out for the host state and for foreign and local investors. This goes beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
In determining the pace of establishment of shale operations in Shale 2.0, an important 
factor will be the application of generally accepted regulatory and contractual practices. The 
developments in the countries examined in this article in the light of their own special and even 
unique country settings may contribute to the development of government responses to industry 
interest in shale resource development. In each case considered here, the governments were alive 
to the benefits of greater energy independence which the development of unconventional 
hydrocarbons resources appears to offer. At the same time, where the social impact of shale gas 
development is likely to be high such as in areas with high-population density (and Argentina is the 
exception here), opposition to this energy choice is likely to be significant. 
Table 1. Shale wells drilled and completed
Year YPF Others Total
2011 20 2 22
2012 25 22 47
2013 104 29 133
2014 160 23 183
2015 178 22 200
2016 103 17 120
2017 64 45 109
Jan–Apr 18 23 33 56
TOTAL 677 193 870
Table 2. Content of regulations on unconventional hydrocarbons E&P
Subject Measures
Plan for previous use of hy-
draulic fracturing
1. The superﬁcial coating must be cemented up to the surface.
2. The cementing process that must be used is pumping and sealing or a similar
one that allows settling of the cement.
3. Superﬁcial coat must be built to a depth not less than 150 feet under any ac-
quirer that could be used for human consumption.
4. It is necessary to carry out pressure test to the casing and dementing.
5. In case there is any problem with cementing or casing, it must be reported
to the authorities, the activities must be suspended immediately
Use of hydraulic fracturing 1. Complete schedule of fracturing activity.
2. Volumes used for the fracture, chemical agents present in the mixture, and
anticipated pressures of fracture.
3. Radius of the hydraulic stimulation for every stage.
4. Baseline of natural radioactive present in the local environment, and poten-
tial measures taken in case of its increase.
5. A program of hydraulic stimulation that includes the high of the casing and
cementing, and an analysis that shows that the cementing and casing will be
able to resist the pressures caused by the stimulation.
Use of Hydraulic Fracturing 1. Execute pressure test over the casing that may be expose to any hydraulic
fracturing activity.
2. The operator must be permanently monitoring the pressure, and if it reaches
a limit149, the operation must be immediately stopped.
3. In case of a leak within the pipes and the casing, the activity must be
stopped, and the authorities must be notiﬁed to act.
4. The regulation establishes a formula to determine the minimum depth from
aquifers allowed to perform hydraulic fracturing.
• Hydraulic fracturing cannot be done within less than 200 meters of an
underground aquifer source of water for agriculture or human consumption.
Re-injection of produced water 1. A general assessment of the geological formation.
2. The measures and pressures of the lateral drilling and fractures of the well.
3. Historic seismicity evidence within 16 km of the location of the well.
Activities that require previous
authorization by the Ministry
of Mines
• Beginning of construction of the well.
• Cementing and casing.
• Test of the preventers.
• Test of casing and cementing.
• Pressure tests.
Table 3. Summary of shale gas country conditions in relation to Shale 1.0 template
Shale 1.0: US Template Argentina Colombia UK
Ownership (private land-
owners with incentives
in key regions)
State ownership but shar-
ing of powers with prov-
inces in federal
structure; energy policy
is federal competence
State ownership, with a
revenue sharing
scheme with the pro-
ducing departments
and municipalities.
Private agreements can
be made with land-
owners and local com-
munities to improve
the processes of local
acceptance of the
operations.
State ownership, with rev-
enue-sharing scheme for
local communities; land
access agreements give
compensation to land-
owners from shale
operators
Allocation of rights by
lease
Extensive provincial
powers over licensing:
to extend licences; ap-
prove assignment; re-
voke and impose
penalties. New conces-
sion created in 2014 for
exploitation of uncon-
ventional resources
Concession arrangement
with a standard model
containing incentives
for unconventional
resources; special regu-
lations and procedures
in place for claims of
overlapping rights-
holders
Licences evolved from exist-
ing conventional pattern
to include Retention
Areas and Development
Areas; consents required
beyond those in the licen-
ces (including environ-
mental, planning & land
access); fast track process-
ing of applications intro-
duced; dedicated
government ofﬁce for
shale gas and oil promo-
tion set up
Players: corporate invest-
ors available with ex-
pertise and access to
capital/service
companies
Dominated by large for-
eign companies; local
content policy to build
up supply chain indus-
try, especially at provin-
cial level
Companies with a long
track record in devel-
oping unconventional
hydrocarbons, such as
ExxonMobil and
ConocoPhillips have
signed agreements for
the exploration of un-
conventional hydrocar-
bons. The NOC,
Ecopetrol, has shown
interest, and has pro-
posed a pilot project,
to dissipate any fears
from the local popula-
tion. There are even
possibilities to create a
spin-off company dedi-
cated specially to these
activities.
Limited corporate interest
to date but regime open
to foreign and domestic
investors
(continued)
Table 3. (continued)
Shale 1.0: US Template Argentina Colombia UK
Pipeline infrastructure &
capacity
Bottleneck; funding and
regulatory issues need to
be addressed if US
model of exporting shale
gas is to be followed
The infrastructure has
been developed for the
main conventional
ﬁelds, for local con-
sumption and export.
New investment has
been made on the in-
frastructure that con-
nects the principal
areas where unconven-
tional hydrocarbons
may be located; how-
ever, some of it needs
to be expanded or
renewed.
Provision made for
improved rules on
infrastructure
Water supply and evolv-
ing regulation
Regulatory controls in
place over water supply
Based on the American
experience the environ-
mental authority has
developed a very strict
regulation for the use
of water. However,
practices such as re-in-
jection are possible.
There are requirements
for drilling, such as the
need of EIA to identify
and protect aquifers.
Re-injection of water pro-
hibited; water abstraction
licence required; ground-
water activity permit
required; disposal of water
may be an issue for regu-
lation if production takes
off
Location in areas of low
population density,
limiting social licence
to operate barriers
Locations are far from
population centres
Population density in
areas of exploration is
not very high.
However, agricultural
activity in the areas has
created concerns on
water resources, and
the potential effects
that unconventional
hydrocarbons activities
may have on crops and
cattle.
Population density high so
social licence is an issue
but note regulatory diver-
gence inside UK with
moratorium in Scotland
Deep capital markets Not available locally Not available locally Available but no production
yet
(continued)
Table 3. (continued)
Shale 1.0: US Template Argentina Colombia UK
High natural gas prices/
gas demand
Need to export gas rather
than use for domestic
consumption
Prices of gas are not
high. Due to climate
change and local issues
to produce electricity,
there is a projection of
a high increase on the
demand for gas in the
next decades.
Yes
Royalties & taxes Provinces take 12% royalty
share on sale of hydro-
carbons; payments in
kind are possible
Tax incentive: royalty is
only 60% of conven-
tional production
Proposal to create allowance
to reduce tax potion on
income from companies
from 62% to 30%
